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 703 
THE TRUE BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN: 
HOW EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES 
MAKE FRAUD VICTIMS WHOLE 
Abstract: For over a century, American courts have recognized emotional dis-
tress damages in tort. Initially, these decisions limited recovery for emotional dis-
tress to cases where the victim experienced a physical impact. Throughout the 
twentieth century, that requirement largely fell out of favor as courts began to 
recognize emotional injury in the absence of physical harm, supported by new 
psychiatric research. Despite this, the availability of emotional distress damages 
in fraud cases continues to divide jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions refuse to rec-
ognize any more than pecuniary damages to plaintiffs in fraud, characterizing  
fraud as a purely economic tort. The experience of victims challenges this as -
sumption, as individuals report significant psychiatric and physical maladies re-
sulting from fraud. Jurisdictions that award emotional distress damages in fraud 
divide further still about the appropriate standard. Some courts focus on the 
plaintiff’s severity of harm or physical manifestation of distress. Others look to 
the defendant’s malice, intent, or ability to foresee emotional harm. This Note ar-
gues that current psychiatric research and self-reported emotional dis tress o f 
fraud victims demonstrate the need to universally recognize emotional distress 
damages. This Note further argues the severity standard offers the best combina-
tion of flexibility for plaintiffs and protection for defendants against frivolous 
claims. Only with the recognition of emotional distress damages can fraud vic-
tims become genuinely whole. 
INTRODUCTION 
Charles and Wanda Phillips thought they had found a safe bet for their re-
tirement money, better than a bank. 1 They invested their entire retirement sav-
ings of $120,000 into the Baptist Foundation of Arizona. 2 The Foundation’s  
promotional videos, screened in community churches, promised that the fund 
had never lost its investors’ money. 3 Charles felt that he could trust the fund 
because he and his wife “were dealing with Christians and a real Christian 
doesn’t steal your money.”4 That changed in 1999 when the investors’ checks 
                                                                                                          
 1 Emily Cartwright, Taken on Faith: A Look into the Baptist Foundation’s Fall, CBS 60 MINUTES 
(July 30, 2002), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/taken-on-faith/ [https://perma.cc/V8RE-R29U]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id.; 60 Minutes, Taken on Faith—How the Wicked Use Religion to Scam the Virtuous, YOU
T UBE (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=krWT1SGrpHY&t=9s [https://perma.cc/
RY9N-96M5]. 
 4 Cartwright, supra note 1. 
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stopped coming, and Charles, Wanda, and 11,000 other investors became vic-
tims of the foundation’s financial collapse due to fraud. 5 
Fraud is its own industry, with billions of dollars stolen every year from 
the world’s biggest companies—and unwary, vulnerable individuals. 6 Some 
fraudsters exploit social connections to attack retirement savings, insurance 
coverage, and personal assets.7 The financial ramifications are readily appar-
ent: losses of homes, cars, and savings.8 In Arizona, the Baptist Foundation 
retirees, having lost most or all of their savings, had to return to work. 9 The 
emotional consequences of such fraud, however, may be less obvious and thus 
forgotten in the effort to make victims whole. 10 In fact, the availability of emo-
tional distress damages divides U.S. courts between those that posit that fraud 
only allows for pecuniary damages, and those that believe emotional distress in 
                                                                                                          
 5 Id.; Veronica Graff, 20 Years Later, Victims of Baptist Foundation of Arizona Scheme Still Re-
covering, PHX. BUS. J. (Dec. 16, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/2018/12/16/20-
years-later-victims-of-baptist-foundation-of.html [https://perma.cc/9UZJ-5RB6] (asserting that the 
Baptist  Foundation of Arizona scandal “is considered one of the largest affinity frauds in U.S histo-
ry”); Todd Starnes, A Look Back at the Arizona Baptist Foundation Struggle, BAPTIST PRESS (Dec. 
17, 1999), http://m.bpnews.net/4394/a-look-back-at-the-arizona-baptist-foundation-struggle [https://
perma.cc/SXJ3-UYU5] (providing an overview of the collapse of the Arizona Baptist Foundation). 
 6 See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS: 2018 GLOBAL STUDY ON 
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 4 (2018) (finding over $7 billion of total fraud losses for busi-
nesses); Roger Aitken, U.S. Card Losses Could Exceed $12B by 2020, FORBES (Oct. 2 6,  2 016 ),  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2016/10/26/us-card-fraud-losses-could-exceed-12bn-by-
2020/#1121fed3d243 [https://perma.cc/KE7S-79YT] (detailing global and American credit card fraud 
loss statistics); Lyle Daly, Identity Theft and Credit Card Fraud Statistics for 2019, MOTLEY FOOL 
(Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.fool.com/the-ascent/research/identity-theft-credit-card-fraud-statistics/ 
[https://perma.cc/R9XH-R7FU] (discussing statistics for individual identity theft). A 2019 study on 
4,425 residents of Madrid, Spain found that 10.8% of respondents had experienced bank fraud. Encar-
nación Sarriá et al., Financial Fraud, Mental Health, and Quality of Life: A Study on the Population 
of the City of Madrid, Spain, INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH, Sept. 6, 2019, at 3. 
 7 See, e.g., Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 862 (Alaska 1999) (insurance recovery); 
Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150, 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (employer/employee fraud 
case); Sumler v. E. Ford, Inc., 2004-CA-01574-COA (¶ 10), 915 So. 2d 1081, 1086 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2005) (automobile repossession); Roberts v. U.S. Home Corp., 694 S.W.2d 129, 129 (Tex. App. 4th 
Dist. 1985) (real estate fraud); Affinity Fraud: How to Avoid Investment Scams That Target Group, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N INV. PUBL’NS (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/investo r /pubs/
affinity.htm [https://perma.cc/T2KF-H599] (defining affinity fraud). The U.S. Securities and Ex -
change Commission defines “[a]ffinity fraud” as “investment scams that prey upon members of iden-
tifiable groups, such as religious or ethnic communities, the elderly, or professional groups.” Affinity 
Fraud, supra. The perpetrator may pose as a fellow affinity member (or actually be a member of that 
community) and enlist group leaders to communicate the fraudulent information. Id. 
 8 See Hoffman v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 297–98 (Md. 2005) (fraud victims lost homes); Sumler, 
2004-CA-01574-COA (¶¶ 24–29), 915 So. 2d at 1088–89 (fraud victim lost car to repossession ); 
Cartwright, supra note 1 (fraud victim lost retirement savings). 
 9 Cartwright, supra note 1. 
 10 See, e.g., Hoffman, 867 A.2d at 295 (stating that victims suffered anger, humiliation, head-
aches, vomiting); Sumler, 2004-CA-01574-COA (¶¶ 30–31), 915 So. 2d at 1089–90 (claims of embar-
rassment and stress); Cartwright, supra note 1 (noting victims’ lack of ability to sleep). 
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fraud cases warrants compensation. 11 Those in the latter group diverge further 
still on the appropriate way to calculate emotional damages. 12 Thus, fraud vic-
tims seeking just compensation for their emotional suffering meet inconsistent 
outcomes. 13 
The requirements for recovery in states that do recognize emotional dis-
tress damages are equally varied. 14 Some jurisdictions require some physical 
manifestation of trauma. 15 These jurisdictions posit that such evidence is nec-
essary to screen out false claims and provide the courts with an administrable 
standard to evaluate emotional distress. 16 This requirement of post-incident 
physical manifestation replaced the former “physical impact” rule.17 The phys-
ical impact rule required that a physical injury must occur before a plaintiff  
could recover for emotional distress damages.18 This rule fell out of favor as 
psychiatric medicine developed standardized diagnostic criteria, and courts  
recognized that emotional injury could be recognized in the absence of physi-
cal injury without inviting a wave of frivolous claims. 19 Other jurisdictions  
adopted standards requiring severe emotional distress, expert medical evi-
dence, or foreseeability of harm by the defendant. 20 
                                                                                                          
 11 See Pecuniary Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining pecuniary 
damages as recovery of only economic damages); Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Dis-
tress in Fraud Litigation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 2, 7–15 (1989) 
(discussing the varied treatment of emotional damages in fraud cases). 
 12 See Nelson, 976 P.2d at 868 (discussing different standards for emotional distress damages in 
fraud cases); Merritt, supra note 11, at 7–15 (same). 
 13 Compare Nelson, 976 P.2d at 868 (permitting emotional distress damages for severe emotional 
distress in a fraud case with an insurance company), with Bates v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 467 N.W.2d 
255, 260 (Iowa 1991) (denying the availability of emotional damages in a fraud case with an insur-
ance company). 
 14 See Nelson, 976 P.2d at 868 (listing the legal standards for emotional distress dam ages in  
fraud). 
 15 See Hoffman, 867 A.2d at 296–97 (discussing Maryland’s requirement of a physical manifesta-
tion of emotional injury before awarding damages). Physical manifestation is a broad definition that 
includes depression and nightmares “to represent that the injury for which recovery is sought is capa-
ble of objective determination.” Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 733–34 (Md. 1979). 
 16 Vance, 408 A.2d at 733. 
 17 Hoffman, 867 A.2d at 295–96. 
 18 See, e.g., Homans v. Bos. Elevated Ry. Co., 62 N.E. 737, 737 (Mass. 1902) (permitting emo-
tional distress damages related to plaintiff’s physical injury on a train). 
 19 Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Colo. 1978) (abandoning a physical impact r e-
quirement based on advances in psychiatry and psychology that reduced the risk of frivolous emotion-
al distress claims); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Mo. 1983) (same); BESSEL A. VAN DER 
KOLK, THE BODY KEEPS THE SCORE: BRAIN, MIND, AND BODY IN THE HEALING OF TRAUMA 139 
(2015) (discussing the pros and cons of diagnostic criteria in AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC 
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS III (1980) [hereinafter DSM III]); see DSM His-
tory, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/history-of-the-
dsm [https://perma.cc/9JNM-788G] (explaining that DSM III established diagnostic criteria). 
 20 See, e.g., Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 868 (Alaska 1999) (requiring severe emo-
tional distress); Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 484–85 (Conn. 1991) (requiring plaintiff’ s 
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Although little research exists on the unique trauma experienced by fraud 
victims, studies reflect that fraud impacts both mental and physical health.21 
Psychiatric understanding of trauma and how it affects the mind and body has 
evolved significantly over the last thirty to forty years. 22 
This Note examines the unique nature of fraud trauma, how fraud impacts 
victims, and compares the prevailing legal approaches to recognizing this 
trauma in fraud lawsuits. 23 Part I explores the history of requirements for emo-
tional distress damages, tracing the law’s development from the anachronistic 
physical impact rule to the modern rules of physical manifestation, severity,  
and foreseeability. 24 Part II begins by surveying state court approaches to emo-
tional distress damages in fraud cases.25 Part II also discusses the development 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress (NIED) claims and examines the century of psychiatric re-
search that uncovered how trauma affects victims’ physical and emotional 
states. 26 Finally, Part III asserts that all American courts should recognize emo-
tional distress damages in fraud cases and proposes a method that would allow 
juries to assess emotional distress damages based on the severity of the trau-
ma. 27 
I. LET’S GET PHYSICAL: FROM THE PHYSICAL IMPACT RULE  
TO THE PHYSICAL MANIFESTATION REQUIREMENT 
Fraud, also known as fraudulent misrepresentation, allows a plaintiff to 
sue when a defendant intended to cause the plaintiff to act or not act based on 
                                                                                                          
emotional distress to have been foreseeable); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996) 
(requiring the plaintiff to support claims with medical or expert opinion). 
 21 See Linda Ganzini et al., Victims of Fraud: Comparing Victims of White Collar and Violent 
Crime, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 55, 56 (1990) (researching emotional distress in affinity 
fraud victims); Sarriá et al., supra note 6, at 10 (finding poorer health and higher levels of mental 
distress among fraud victims as compared to non-victim peers); Maria Victoria Zunzunegui et al.,  
Financial Fraud and Health: The Case of Spain, 31 GACETA SANITARIA 313, 317–18 (2017) (Spain) 
(discussing fraud victims self-reporting substandard physical health). 
 22 VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at 39–47 (discussing neuroscience advances confirming biolog-
ic change due to trauma). Research demonstrates that a traumatized individual’s brain reacts in a simi-
lar way when recounting the traumatic incident as it did when the incident occurred. Id. at 42–43. For 
example, one patient, after reading a script detailing the car crash that killed her daughter thirteen 
years prior, felt a fight or flight response (confirmed via magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan) 
similar to what she experienced on the day of the accident. Id. at 45–46. These developments connect 
physical symptoms to underlying emotional distress. See, e.g., id. at 7–9 (discussing sleeplessness, 
nightmares, and emotional disturbance associated with trauma in a Vietnam veteran). 
 23 See infra notes 28–280 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 28–108 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 109–204 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 205–237 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 238–280 and accompanying text. 
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the defendant’s misrepresentation of a material fact or opinion. 28 Fraud affects 
all aspects of society, costing businesses an estimated seven billion dollars ,  
draining over eight billion dollars from U.S. banks through credit card fraud, 
and affecting hundreds of thousands of Americans every year. 29 To individuals, 
the experience of fraud may feel like a personal attack on their economic and 
mental well-being. 30 Personal transactions commonly underlie cases where the 
plaintiff seeks emotional damages for fraud. 31 
Instructive in the study of emotional distress damages in fraud cases is a 
look at how IIED32 and NIED actions assess emotional distress damages be-
                                                                                                          
 28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. L. INST. 1977). Fraud, as a tort, generally de-
fies a singular definition as fraud can take a number of forms. Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 342 
(Tenn. 2012). In general, courts look for a defendant’s deceit or misrepresentation to gain a financial 
advantage. Id. A Tennessee court stated that the cause of action of “deceit” as well as “‘intentional 
misrepresentation,’ ‘fraudulent misrepresentation,’ and ‘fraud’ are different names for the same cause 
of action.” Id. Courts also recognize a separate tort of “negligent misrepresentation” for defendant 
negligence rather than intentional conduct. Id. at 344; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (re-
quiring an underlying business transaction before allowing an action for negligent misrepresentation). 
This Note uses the word “fraud” to encompass both the intentional and negligent causes of action, as a 
plaintiff that successfully proves either of these should have emotional distress damages available to 
them. See Merritt, supra note 11, at 25 (asserting that, just as courts recognize emotional distress in 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotio nal dist ress 
(NIED) cases, fraud victims are just as deserving of compensation); Justin Sevier & Kelli Alces Wil-
liams, Consumers, Seller-Advisors, and the Psychology of Trust, 59 B.C. L. REV. 931, 940–42 (2018) 
(equivocating only intentional misrepresentation with fraud but noting that the narrow scope of the 
intentional misrepresentation cause of action led to the creation of a negligent misrepresentation cause 
of action). 
 29 See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, supra note 6, at 4 (finding over seven billion dol-
lars of total fraud losses for businesses); Aitken, supra note 6 (detailing global and American credit 
card fraud loss statistics); Daly, supra note 6 (discussing statistics about individual identity t hef t, 
namely 444,602 fraud cases reported in 2018). 
 30 See Financial Fraud Crime Victims, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DIST. OF ALASKA, https://www.
justice.gov/usao-ak/financial-fraud-crimes [https://perma.cc/UNM4-MQJH] (discussing commo n 
types of fraud as well as common victim reactions). 
 31 See, e.g., Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 862 (Alaska 1999) (insurance recovery); 
Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150, 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (employer/employee fraud 
case); Sumler v. E. Ford, Inc., 2004-CA-01574-COA (¶ 10), 915 So. 2d 1081, 1086 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2005) (automobile repossession); Roberts v. U.S. Home Corp., 694 S.W.2d 129, 129 (Tex.  App . 
1985) (real estate fraud). 
 32 See, e.g., Nelson, 976 P.2d at 868 (requiring severe damage to the plaintiff’s mental state in a 
fraud case before awarding emotional distress compensation in line with the state’s IIED requir e-
ments). IIED requirements are adopted by judicial decision, but generally courts require (1) extreme 
and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause severe emotional distress, (3) causation, and (4) resulting 
severe emotional distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988) (stating elements of  
IIED); Chanko v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 49 N.E.3d 1171, 1178 (N.Y. 2016) (same). Defining extreme 
and outrageous conduct, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states “where the conduct . . . go[es] be-
yond all possible bounds of decency, and . . . [is] regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community . . . an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against 
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d. 
Severity of emotional distress may require physical or psychological manifestations of that trauma 
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cause the applicable legal standards often overlap. 33 The development of this 
body of law has undergone significant change since the late nineteenth centu-
ry. 34 Section A of this Part explores the rise of the physical impact rule as  a 
prerequisite for emotional damages recovery and how developments in psychi-
atric medicine predicated the rule’s downfall. 35 Section B discusses rationales 
for requiring some physical manifestation of emotional distress before award-
ing damages. 36 Finally, Section C reviews alternative legal standards in states 
where physical manifestation is not necessary to recover for emotional dis -
tress. 37 
A. Physical Injury and Intent for Emotional Distress Damages 
The physical impact rule dominated emotional distress in negligence cas-
es as the majority view from the inception of such damages well into the twen-
tieth century. 38 The prevailing view among state courts deemed emotional dis-
tress damages “parasitic,” or dependent on a physical injury and thus requiring 
a “host” cause of action for an award. 39 The rationale for this  rule seemed 
                                                                                                          
along with proof of medical treatment. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSON-
AL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 621 (8th ed. 2017). 
 33 See Dziadek v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 867 F.3d 1003, 1010 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[A] plaintiff 
must prove intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress to recover for mental or emotional 
harm on a fraud claim.” (interpreting Stabler v. First State Bank of Roscoe, 2015 SD 44, ¶ 24, 865 
N.W.2d 466, 479 (S.D. 2015))); Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 484–85 (Conn. 1991) (citing 
damages standards from an unintentional infliction of emotional distress case and applying them to 
fraud cases); Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 732–34 (Md. 1979) (applying an NIED standard requir-
ing a physical manifestation of emotional injury to a fraud case); Merritt, supra note 11, at 18 (dis-
cussing the importation of IIED requirements to emotional distress recovery in fraud cases). The Re-
statement (Third) of Torts’ NIED definition describes a cause of action when a defendant’s negligent 
act causes serious emotional harm because the action caused a fear of physical injury or “occurs in the 
course of specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct 
is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY 
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 (AM. L. INST. 2012). Most jurisdictions now recognize 
NIED. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 32, at 625 (noting that a small number of courts do not have a 
cause of action for NIED). 
 34 See infra notes 51–61 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 38–70 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 71–81 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 82–108 and accompanying text. 
 38 See Vance, 408 A.2d at 731 (discussing the history of the physical impact rule). 
 39 See, e.g., Homans v. Bos. Elevated Ry. Co., 62 N.E. 737, 737 (Mass. 1902) (permitting recov-
ery for “nervous shock” because the plaintiff experienced a physical injury in a sudden train stop -
page); Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 418 (Mont. 1995) (defining “‘parasit-
ic’ damages”); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354 (N.Y. 1896) (denying recovery for 
distress and resultant miscarriage caused by the defendant’s negligence in absence of physical im-
pact). The Mitchell court confirmed that the physical impact rule formed the “consensus . . . opinion” 
of the time. 45 N.E. at 354. 
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straightforward at the time: physical injury provided an objective element nec-
essary to prevent frivolous claims from mere “psychic” injuries. 40 
The burgeoning psychiatric science of the late nineteenth century had not 
yet developed a courtroom-applicable understanding of emotional distress.41 
For example, in 1897, in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad Co., the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court addressed the question of whether a plaintiff 
could recover for only emotional distress without an associated physical inju-
ry. 42 The plaintiff passenger claimed she suffered an emotional injury when a 
fellow passenger and the defendant’s employee fought in her proximity. 43 The 
court recognized that emotional distress might lead to physical impac t,  and 
thus, negligence may cause such ultimate injury. 44 The opinion noted that 
courts traditionally permit recovery for injuries that naturally flow from negli-
gence, and the plaintiff’s physical injury arising from emotional distress did 
flow from the defendant’s negligence. 45 Despite this, the court held that a 
plaintiff could not recover for emotional distress damages for “mere fright” 
without an initial physical injury. 46 The reasoning came down to administrabil-
ity and fairness concerns about any alternative rule other than one requir ing 
physical impact. 47 In 1896, just before Spade, the New York Court of Appeals 
reached a similar conclusion in Mitchell v. Rochester Railroad Co. 48 The 
                                                                                                          
 40 See Spade v. Lynn & Bos. Ry. Co., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897) (holding that damages for 
“mere fright” likely come from practical concerns with implementing a rule to the contrary), abrogat-
ed by Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354–55 (worrying 
about a “flood of lit igation in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned without 
detection”). 
 41 Compare Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354–55 (denying emotional distress damages absent physical 
injury based on fraud concerns), with Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Colo. 1978) (dis-
patching older rationales for the physical impact rule that relied on concerns about frivolous claims 
and unreliable proof in favor of removing the physical impact requirement based on advances in psy-
chiatry and psychology), and Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Mo. 1983) (same). 
 42 47 N.E. at 88. 
 43 Spade v. Lynn & Bos. Ry. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 285 (Mass. 1897) (reporting the same Supreme 
Judicial Court opinion as Spade, 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897), but also summarizing the procedural histo-
ry and facts found at the trial court level). The plaintiff alleged the defendant train company allowed 
the problematic passenger on the train despite the passenger’s intoxication. Id. at 286. While standing 
next to the plaintiff, the intoxicated passenger and defendant’s employee got into a fight regarding fare 
payment. Id. The brawl did not injure the plaintiff physically; however, the experience “subjected her 
to a severe nervous shock . . . [causing] great mental and physical pain and anguish.” Id. at 285–86. 
 44 Spade, 47 N.E. at 88–89. The court stated that a plaintiff’s emotional distress must connect to a 
physical injury before allowing recovery. Id. at 89. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. First , the court worried that recognizing emotional distress without physical injury would 
lead to frivolous claims, burdening the judicial system and requiring decisions based on potentially 
unfounded claims. Id. Second, the court worried about fairness, particularly to passenger rail defend-
ants who could become liable for injuries to especially sensitive passengers. Id. 
 48 See id. at 88–89 (requiring physical impact); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354–
55 (N.Y. 1896) (same), overruled by Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961). The plaintiff in 
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Mitchell court ruled against the passenger plaintiff because a physical injury 
did not immediately precede her emotional distress. 49 The court went further to 
state that plaintiffs needed some injury, no matter how slight, to recover for  
emotional distress because otherwise plaintiffs can simply manufacture emo-
tional injuries. 50 
Such results are not surprising given the understanding of trauma in the 
late nineteenth century. 51 In the courtroom, judges demanded that plaintiffs  
connect a physical injury to their resulting emotional distress damages. 52 
Meanwhile, in the doctor’s office, psychiatrists and neurologists struggled with 
the burgeoning study of mental distress. 53 Medical professionals focused on 
hysteria, working to understand what caused irrational, emotional, and unex-
plained physical phenomena among patients. 54 Groundbreaking studies traced 
the onset of hysteria to a patient’s prior trauma instead of attributing it to less 
scientific causes such as patient gender or “demonic possession states, witch-
                                                                                                          
Mitchell sued the defendant railroad company for an incident that occurred while she was waiting to 
board a train car. 45 N.E. at 354. When the plaintiff started boarding the car, a horse drawn carriage of 
the defendant nearly crashed into her but did not physically impact her. Id. The plaintiff claimed the 
incident caused her to faint, suffer a miscarriage, and spurred additional subsequent injuries. Id. Her 
testimony was supported by expert medical opinion. Id. 
 49 45 N.E. at 354. 
 50 Id. at  354–55. Though the physical impact rule became the majority position in the United 
States, not all courts felt that the rule was necessary to prevent frivolous claims. See Sloane v. S. Cal. 
Ry. Co., 44 P. 320, 323–24 (Cal. 1896) (holding in favor of permitting emotional distress damages 
even in the absence of physical injury because such damages resulted from the negligence of the de-
fendant). 
 51 See VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at 178–79 (providing an overview of the status of psychiat-
ric medicine and trauma in the late nineteenth century). 
 52 See, e.g., Spade, 47 N.E. at 89 (evaluating emotional distress injury on a railroad); Mitchell, 45 
N.E. at 354–55 (same). 
 53 See VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at 178 (characterizing the late nineteenth century as the 
period “when medicine first began the systematic study of mental problems”). 
 54 Id. at  179. Interestingly, researchers in France and England also studied and published articles 
about the trauma experienced in rail passengers after accidents, although that literature does not ap-
pear in the cases discussed previously. See, e.g., Spade, 47 N.E. at 89; Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354–55; 
VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at 178–79. Several prominent psychiatrists and neuroscientists worked 
to understand these newly recognized trauma impacts. See VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at  1 79 
(discussing the development of researchers’ understanding of hysteria); see also Théodule Ribo t,  
Diseases of Memory: An Essay in the Positive Psychology, in 41 THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC 
SERIES 108–09 (William Huntington Smith trans., 1882) (finding that although mental status is not 
well understood, it can go through rapid changes that cause marked changes in personality due t o  
underlying issues); The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume II (1893–1895): Studies on Hysteria, Translated from the German Under the General Editor-
ship of James Strachey, PSYCHOANALYTIC ELEC. PUBL’G, https://www.pep-web.org/do cument.
php?id=se.002.0000a [https://perma.cc/KJ6V-28XZ] (translating Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud’s 
finding that hysteria, although it could appear suddenly, traced back to underlying prior traumas expe-
rienced by the patient). 
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craft, exorcism, and religious ecstasy.”55 In particular, researchers focused on 
case studies of hysteria resulting from traumatic injuries. 56 In 1889, Jean-
Martin Charcot released his study of a patient following an accident w ith a 
horse and buggy. 57 The patient was physically unharmed, yet he still experi-
enced paralysis in his legs. 58 Charcot found that the last memory the patient 
had of the accident was seeing the cart’s wheels coming towards his legs and 
believing they would injure him. 59 The wheels missed him, but the experience 
so affected him that his mind substituted a physical manifestation of his trau-
ma, paralysis, for the memory of the incident.60 This study greatly influenced 
the early scientific understanding of trauma; however, interest in the topic de-
creased as researchers focused on other theories of emotional suffering, leav-
ing contemporaneous courts without guidance in measuring victim’s emotional 
suffering absent physical injury. 61 
Although interest in studying trauma languished through the mid-
twentieth century, the study of psychiatry and psychology became generally 
more rigorous, leading to the diagnostic standards set by the American Psychi-
atric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III 
(DSM III). 62 Published in 1980, this manual used decades of research to craft 
formal criteria for mental disorders. 63 This new, more thorough diagnostic ap-
proach aided courts’ understanding of emotional distress. 64 For example,  in 
1983, in Bass v. Nooney Co., the Missouri Supreme Court revisited the state’s 
                                                                                                          
 55 VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at 179; see The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychologi-
cal Works of Sigmund Freud, supra note 54, at 4. 
 56 VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at 179. Charcot’s studies fell against the backdrop of political 
and religious upheaval in France, a time at which Charcot felt understanding behavior was crucial to 
installing a secular government. Id. Charcot knew that women were important to winning a secular 
majority and set out to research hysteria and how the conditions affected both men and women. Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at  179–80. This research influenced the early study of trauma and resonates today wit h  
those that continue in the field. Id. at 180. 
 61 Id. at  186 (discussing Charcot’s death and Freud’s new interest in “inner conflicts, defenses, 
and instincts at the root of mental suffering”). Interest in the subject waxed and waned throughout the 
early part of the twentieth century. Id. at 186–90. The two great wars and the rise in “shell shock” 
drove brief interest in the 1920s and again in the 1940s. Id. at 187. Shell shock eventually became 
better known as post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 189. The abandonment of its study in the post-
World War I period led to domestic issues with returning veterans, due to lack of mental and physical 
support for the trauma they suffered during the war. Id. at 187–88. 
 62 Id. at  139; see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 19 (detailing novel diagnostic criteria). 
 63 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 19. The manual combines research by the World Health 
Organization, the American military, and the American Psychiatric Association. Id. 
 64 See T imothy J. McCormally, Recent Development, Torts—Mental Distress—Prince v. Pittston 
Co., 63 F.R.D. 28 (S.D.W. Va. 1974), 63 GEO. L.J. 1179, 1183–85 (1975) (discussing the then-status 
of court views regarding emotional distress injuries independent of physical injury and the develop-
ment of psychiatric medicine that began to change court opinion). 
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physical impact requirement for emotional distress damages. 65 The court abro-
gated the physical impact rule, acknowledging overwhelming disdain for the 
rule in scholarly articles. 66 The Bass opinion cited increasingly absurd defini-
tions of the term “physical impact” used by other courts to permit plaintiff re-
covery. 67 The court also relied on the development of psychiatric medicine as 
providing a reasonable basis for dropping the physical impact rule and instead 
relying on scientific evidence to establish the severity of emotional harm.68 Fi-
nally, the opinion pointed to the fact that the majority of courts had already 
abandoned the physical impact rule, including the progenitor courts in Massa-
chusetts and New York.69 Today, only a few jurisdictions, including Indiana and 
Georgia, continue to adhere to the physical impact rule in negligence cases.70 
                                                                                                          
 65 646 S.W.2d 765, 766 (Mo. 1983). The plaintiff sued the defendant building owner for emotion-
al distress suffered when she became trapped in a malfunctioning elevator. Id. at 766–67. The plaintiff 
experienced symptoms of extreme anxiety after the incident, including passing out the next time she 
attempted to use the building’s elevator. Id. at 767. Prior to this opinion, Missouri had adopted the 
physical impact rule in the late nineteenth century, following the leads of Massachusetts and New 
York. Id. at  768 (referencing Mitchell and Spade as the generators of the physical impact rule in the 
United States). 
 66 See id. at  769. The articles and criticism included a number of pieces written by Professo r 
Prosser as well as other scholarly articles as far back as 1921. Id.; see, e.g., William L. Prosser, Insult 
and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 42–43 (1956) (discussing the development of an independent tort 
for emotional distress and rejecting concerns about false claims); Archibald H. Throckmorton, Dam-
ages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260, 267 (1921) (challenging the physical impact rule on the basis 
that “[a] shock to the nerves is not an affection of the mind, but of the body”). 
 67 See Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769; see also Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 731–32 (Md. 1979 ) 
(noting the “rule was on occasion stretched to extreme limits to permit recovery for mental distress,” 
such as cases characterizing smoke inhalation and dust particles in the eye as physical impacts). 
 68 Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769–70. At the very least, the court felt that the scientific basis for emo-
tional distress was strong enough to abandon a rule that denied plaintiffs the opportunity to plead their 
case to a jury. Id. 
 69 See id. at  769 (first citing Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (Mass. 1978); and 
then citing Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. 1961)). The Massachusetts and New York 
courts recognized that plaintiffs had stretched the definition of physical impact to fit within the rule 
and that legal scholarship generally advocated for removing the physical impact rule. See Dziokonski, 
380 N.E.2d at 1298–99; Battalla, 176 N.E.2d at 731. 
 70 See Atl. Coast Airlines v. Cook, 857 N.E.2d 989, 991 (Ind. 2006) (requiring plaintiff to demon-
strate physical impact before allowing for recovery under a negligence theory); Lee v. State Farm  
Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 82, 86 (Ga. 2000) (acknowledging the shortfalls of the physical impact rule 
but finding that “a brighter line of liability” was more beneficial than any alternative); RESTATEMENT 
(T HIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 reporters’ note cmt. b (AM. L. 
INST. 2012). Indiana follows a “modified impact rule” that requires some physical touching but does 
not necessarily require a physical injury. Cook, 857 N.E.2d at 996. The court maintains this rule be-
cause without physical impact “mental anguish is speculative, subject to exaggeration, likely to lead to 
fictit ious claims.” Id. at 995. In NIED cases, Indiana has a bystander exception that allows recovery 
without physical impact if the plaintiff directly observed the traumatic incident involving a close fa-
milial relation. Id. at 997. 
2021] Emotional Distress Damages in Fraud 713 
B. Emotional Injury Manifesting Physical Symptoms 
In the absence of the physical impact rule, the question becomes: how  
should jurisdictions assess the presence of emotional distress?71 In some states, 
the standard shifted from requiring evidence of physical impact immediately 
preceding the incident to requiring physical manifestation of the emotional 
distress soon afterward.72 The rationale echoes the nineteenth-century reason-
ing for the original physical impact rule: administrability. 73 For example, the 
Maryland Supreme Court set forth its physical manifestation requirement for 
NIED claims in Bowman v. Williams in 1933. 74 Maryland rejected the physical 
impact rule twenty-five years earlier but sought another way to measure emo-
tional distress. 75 Today, the Maryland Supreme Court requires an objectively 
apparent physical manifestation of emotional distress to recover damages.76 
The Maryland Court of Appeals applied this physical manifestation re-
quirement to emotional distress damages in fraud cases in 1979, in Vance v. 
Vance. 77 The plaintiff wife sued the defendant husband for negligent misrepre-
sentation when he annulled their eighteen-year marriage because he was  still 
married to his first wife at the time of his marriage to the plaintiff.78 At the in-
termediate appellate level, the plaintiff wife sufficiently demonstrated emotional 
                                                                                                          
 71 See Lee, 533 S.E.2d at 85 (assessing the alternative standards of other jurisdictions that the 
court could adopt instead of the physical impact rule, including foreseeability and “zone of danger” 
requirements). Courts look to the requirements in IIED and NIED cases when crafting general damag-
es standards. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (noting similarities in the treatment of 
IIED and NIED claims and how courts address emotional distress as parasitic damages in fraud cases). 
 72 See, e.g., Vance, 408 A.2d at 732 (noting that Maryland rejected the physical impact rule in 
favor of the “modern rule” requiring a plaintiff to show resultant physical injury from the defendant’s 
action); Dziokonski, 380 N.E.2d at 1302 (overturning the physical impact rule and instead requiring 
evidence of “substantial” physical injury from the emotional harm and evidence that the injury flowed 
from the defendant’s negligence). 
 73 See, e.g., Vance, 408 A.2d at 731–34 (discussing Maryland’s requirement for physical symp-
toms from emotional distress as a “sufficient guarantee of genuineness that would otherwise be absent 
in a claim for mental distress alone”); Stellar v. Saucon Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2011-C-4714, 2012 Pa. 
Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 702, at *20–21 (C.P. Ct. Lehigh Cty. 2012) (requiring both foreseeability 
of emotional injury and physical manifestation of emotional injury to limit these claims to a small 
subset of facts). 
 74 165 A. 182, 183–85 (Md. 1933). The plaintiff suffered emotional distress when a truck, driven 
by the defendant’s employee, skidded off the road and crashed into a part of his home where his chil-
dren were playing. Id. at 182. The impact did not physically injure the plaintiff, but he sued to recover 
for the shock to his nervous system caused by concern for his children. Id. at  182–83. 
 75 See id. at  184 (citing Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 73 A. 688, 690–92 (Md. 1909)). 
 76 Id. 
 77 See 408 A.2d at 732–34. The plaintiff and defendant married in 1956 and divorced in 1974 
when the defendant husband left the plaintiff wife for another woman. Id. at 729. The husband then 
tried to annul his marriage to the plaintiff because he was still married to his first wife at the time of 
the marriage to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff, unaware that the defendant was still married at the time 
of their union, sued for fraud and IIED following this disclosure. Id. 
 78 Id. at  729. 
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distress to support a jury award for this injury.79 On final appeal, the court ex-
panded the definition of physical injury to permit recovery for emotional distress 
under the Bowman standard.80 Thus, the court required some physical manifesta-
tion to provide objective confirmation of emotional distress but was willing to 
stretch the word “physical” to accommodate a broad range of claims.81 
C. Assessing Distress in the Absence of Physical Symptoms 
In contrast to jurisdictions that require physical manifestation of emotion-
al injury to award distress damages in fraud cases, other courts look to the 
foreseeability or severity of the plaintiff’s emotional distress, or to medic al 
expert corroboration of the emotional distress. 82 Some states adopted one of 
these more subjective criteria upon abandoning the physical manifestation re-
quirement. 83 
One standard looks to the defendant’s ability to foresee the emotional in-
jury. 84 The foreseeability test follows the tort law idea that, regardless of intent, 
defendants should compensate plaintiffs for all reasonably foreseeable damag-
es caused by their tortious actions. 85 For example, in 1991 in Kilduff v. Adams, 
Inc., the plaintiffs did not plead that the defendant intended to cause their emo-
tional distress. 86 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Connecticut recognized 
                                                                                                          
 79 Id. at  731. 
 80 Id. at  733–34. The court held that the plaintiff sufficiently established emotional dist r ess 
through evidence of emotional shock and “spontaneous crying” resulting from the annulment of the 
marriage. Id. at 734. 
 81 See id. (including depression, sleeplessness, and spontaneous crying in the definition of physi-
cal injury); see also Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, LLC, 967 So. 2d 846, 850 (Fla. 2007) (stating that 
the Florida rule for recovery of emotional distress in the absence of physical impact requires physical 
manifestation of emotional injury “‘within a short time’ of the incident”). 
 82 See, e.g., Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 868 (Alaska 1999) (maintaining that se-
vere emotional damages are necessary to sustain emotional distress damages in a fraud case to stay in 
line with the state’s IIED requirements); Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 484–85 (Conn. 1991) 
(permitting emotional distress damages in a fraud case because the distress was reasonably foreseea-
ble); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that the standard for NIED claims 
is a general negligence test and that recovery for emotional distress requires severe emotional distress 
supported by medical or expert opinion). 
 83 See Montinieri v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1183–84 (Conn. 1978) (abandoning 
the physical manifestation rule in NIED cases for a foreseeability standard); Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 
443–44 (noting that Tennessee previously followed the physical manifestation rule but was incon-
sistent in its application before adopting the new general negligence standard). 
 84 See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968) (expanding the application of emotion-
al distress damages generally to plaintiffs that defendant could reasonably foresee would incur an  
emotional injury); Kilduff, 593 A.2d at 484–85 (implementing a reasonable foreseeability standard in 
a fraud case). 
 85 See Montinieri, 398 A.2d at 1184 (holding that a reasonable foreseeability standard recognizes 
emotional distress in the absence of physical injury but also protects defendants from a deluge o f  
frivolous suits). 
 86 593 A.2d at 485 n.11. 
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reasonable foreseeability as a basis for damages, aligning its standard for emo-
tional distress damages in fraud cases with its standard for other torts.87 
California pioneered this approach in 1968, in Dillon v. Legg. 88 In Dillon, 
the California Supreme Court evaluated the foreseeability element of the de-
fendant driver’s duty to the bystander mother who witnessed the fatal accident 
that killed her child. 89 The court held that liability exists where a defendant 
could reasonably foresee the plaintiff’s risk of harm. 90 The court listed factors 
for evaluating foreseeability and noted that, although their application might be 
fluid, potential administrability issues should not stand in the way of plaintiffs 
invoking this criteria. 91 Foreseeability factors also protect defendants from frivo-
lous claims by formally structuring which plaintiffs may bring such claims.92 
Tennessee requires medical expert corroboration of severe emotional dis-
tress to qualify for any corresponding damages.93 In 1996, in Camper v. Minor, 
the Tennessee Supreme Court moved from a physical manifestation rule in emo-
tional distress cases to a “general negligence” standard.94 In abandoning a physi-
cal requirement, the court still wanted independent verification of severe emo-
tional distress and held that the best way to ensure legitimacy is through a medi-
cal or scientific expert opinion. 95 The Illinois Supreme Court questioned this  
requirement in 2010 in Thornton v. Garcini.96 The court held that although med-
                                                                                                          
 87 Id. at  485. 
 88 441 P.2d at 919–21; see Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 443 (noting California’s lead in using a fore-
seeability analysis in emotional distress cases). 
 89 Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914. The plaintiff brought one claim against the defendant for negligent 
driving that resulted in the death of her child and a second claim for the emotional distress she experi-
enced witnessing the incident. Id. 
 90 Id. at  919–20. 
 91 Id. at  920–21. The California Supreme Court considered (1) whether the bystander was in close 
physical proximity to the accident, (2) whether the emotional injury resulted from observations/feelings 
at the time of the accident, and (3) the nature of the relationship between the victim and the observer. Id. 
at  920. 
 92 Id. at  925. This standard raised concern in at least one other court due to its fact sensitive na-
ture. See Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 443 (asserting that this standard did not provide “concrete guidelines 
for trial courts and juries to use in deciding how each case should be resolved”). 
 93 Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446. 
 94 Id. at 446. The plaintiff cement truck driver sued the defendant car driver after the defendant 
pulled in front of his truck. Id. at 439. The plaintiff claimed emotional distress after witnessing the 
defendant’s dead body in the accident’s wreckage. Id. 
 95 Id. at  446. The court wanted to protect defendants from frivolous claims and thus permitted 
recovery in NIED cases only for severe emotional distress. Id. The court recognized this sev erity 
“where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental 
stress engendered by the circumstances of the case.” Id. (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 
520 (Haw. 1970), superseded by statute, 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws 12–13, as recognized in City of Tyler 
v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1997)). 
 96 See 928 N.E.2d 804, 809 (Ill. 2010). The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant physician for 
NIED related to medical malpractice claims. Id. at 807. 
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ical expert testimony may be necessary to prove emotional distress in some cas-
es, state law did not always require such testimony for plaintiff recovery.97 
Finally, some jurisdictions undertake a severity assessment to determine 
whether a plaintiff’s claimed injury should qualify for emotional distress dam-
ages. 98 Plaintiffs support the severity of their emotional distress in these courts 
through medical expert testimony, evidence of a psychiatric condition or loss 
of consortium, and other such evidence. 99 The Utah Supreme Court ap-
proached this issue in 2001 in Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co. 100 The plaintiff driver sued the defendant insurance company over 
fraudulent misrepresentations made during settlement talks following a fatal 
auto accident. 101 The jury found in favor of the plaintiff; however, the tr ial 
judge refused to allow the jury to award emotional distress damages and lim-
ited the fraud damages to pecuniary loss. 102 On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court overturned that decision and the prior state precedent that had set this  
limitation. 103 The court stated that emotional distress damages are available in 
fraud cases where emotional distress is the proximate result of the fraud and 
the plaintiff suffered severe distress.104 This standard guards against frivolous 
suits for mere hurt feelings or minor distress. 105 
The common theme in all these standards is that courts seek to award emo-
tional distress damages to deserving plaintiffs but also want to provide safe-
guards to protect defendants against frivolous or minor claims. 106 State courts 
                                                                                                          
 97 Id. at  809. 
 98 Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 868 (Alaska 1999); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, ¶¶ 102–06, 65 P.3d 1134, 1164–65, rev’d on other grounds, State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); see also Atl. Coast Airlines v. Cook,  8 57  
N.E.2d 989, 991 (Ind. 2006) (following the “modified physical impact” rule which requires severe 
emotional distress where physical impact is “slight”). This was also part of the Camper court’s eval-
uation of NIED claims. 915 S.W.2d at 446 (requiring severe emotional distress supported by medical 
expert opinion). 
 99 See Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 767 (Haw. 1974) (immediate and long-term psychologi-
cal impacts); Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446 (medical expert testimony); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alex-
ander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 327–28 (Tex. 1993) (loss of consortium claim). Severity tests help to screen 
out “ trivial or fraudulent actions.” Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446. 
 100 See 2001 UT 89, ¶¶ 102–04, 65 P.3d at 1164. 
 101 Id. ¶¶ 6–12, 1142–43. 
 102 Id. ¶¶ 102–106, 1164–65. 
 103 Id. (overturning Turner v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
 104 See id. ¶¶ 102–06, 1164–65. 
 105 See Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 868 (Alaska 1999) (evidence of anger and 
aggravation did not support a finding of severe emotional distress damages); Campbell, 2001 UT 89, 
¶¶ 102–06, 65 P.3d at 1164–65 (overturning a prohibition on emotional damages in fraud cases in  
favor of a severity standard). 
 106 See Nelson, 976 P.2d at 868 (severity standard protects defendants); Montinieri v. S. New 
Eng. Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978) (foreseeability protects defendants); Camper v .  
Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996) (medical or scientific expert testimony protects defend-
ants). 
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apply these varying standards unevenly in fraud cases, leading to varying levels 
of compensation for fraud victims.107 As such, a consistent standard for emotion-
al distress damages in fraud cases is necessary to promote equal justice.108 
II. PECUNIARY PARTICULARITY: JURISDICTIONAL DIVERGENCE AND 
CURRENT PSYCHIATRIC UNDERSTANDING OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
American courts have recognized emotional damages in tort for well over 
a century. 109 Scientific understanding of the underlying trauma associated with 
those emotional damages, however, is a relatively new phenomenon.110 Many 
courts that recognize emotional distress damages in fraud cases require physi-
cal manifestations of emotional distress or a showing of wanton or reckless  
conduct by the tortfeasor.111 Other courts, however, recognize emotional dis-
tress without physical manifestation as a separately compensable injury. 112 
Section A of this Part analyzes all fifty states’ positions toward emotional dis-
tress damages in fraud cases.113 Section B discusses modern legal standards for 
emotional distress damages and our current understanding of trauma, particu-
larly in the fraud context. 114 
                                                                                                          
 107 See, e.g., Merritt, supra note 11, at 2 (noting the split in American courts regarding emotional 
distress damages in fraud); Financial Fraud Crime Victims, supra note 30 (stating that fraud perpetra-
tors target everyone regardless of age, race, or geography). 
 108 See Merritt, supra note 11, at 3 (advocating for consistent recognition of emotional distress 
damages in fraud to fully compensate victims). 
 109 See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Bos. Ry. Co., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897) (disallowing recovery 
for fright or alarm in the absence of a physical injury), abrogated by Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 
N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Canning v. Williamstown, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 451, 452 (1848) (allowing 
recovery of emotional damages due to associated physical injury); Renner v. Canfield, 30 N.W. 435, 
436 (Minn. 1886) (holding that awarding emotional damages requires physical injury). 
 110 See VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at 139 (stating that “[t]he first serious attempt to create a 
systematic manual of psychiatric diagnoses occurred in 1980”); DSM History, supra note 19. 
 111 See, e.g., Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 732 (Md. 1979) (discussing the “modern rule” per-
mitting recovery when there is a physical injury arising from negligence); Sumler v. E. Ford, Inc.,  
2004-CA-01574-COA (¶ 26), 915 So. 2d 1081, 1089 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (requiring evidence that 
the defendant acted with malice, indifference or recklessness before awarding emotional distress dam-
ages in fraud). 
 112 See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (Haw. 1970) (holding that courts may evaluate 
independent claims for emotional distress without attendant physical injury), superseded by statute, 
1986 Haw. Sess. Laws 12–13, as recognized in City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1997). 
 113 See infra notes 115–204 and accompanying text. 
 114 See infra notes 205–237 and accompanying text. 
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A. Fraud and the Recognition of Emotional Distress 
Jurisdictional variance in the treatment of emotional damages in fraud 
cases creates a patchwork of state laws for plaintiffs. 115 In many dec is ions  
denying emotional distress damages, courts left their reasons for allowing or 
barring damages unexplored, instead deferring to precedent or a treatise. 116 
This Section categorizes jurisdictions based on their decision (or refusal)  to 
recognize emotional distress damages and further groups jurisdictions that rec-
ognize emotional distress damages by prevailing standards. 117 
1. No Recovery for Emotional Distress 
At least seventeen (and as many as nineteen) states limit recovery in fraud 
cases to pecuniary damages, awarding monetary compensation only for meas-
urable economic losses. 118 Many of these states rely on the Restatement (Sec-
                                                                                                          
 115 See Hoffman v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 297–98 (Md. 2005) (discussing the split in recogni-
tion in other jurisdictions and their rationales). See generally Merritt, supra note 11, at 6–15 (discuss-
ing the varied treatment of emotional damages in fraud cases). 
 116 See, e.g., Ma v. Cmty. Bank, 686 F.2d 459, 469 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying Wisconsin law and 
holding that recovery for emotional damages in a fraud case requires four IIED-like elements); Bates 
v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 467 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Iowa 1991) (relying on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF T ORTS § 549 (AM. L. INST. 1977) to support the proposition that even though the plaintiff may 
have experienced emotional distress, fraud is a purely “economic tort” and thus the plaintiff can only 
recover pecuniary damages). 
 117 See infra notes 118–204 and accompanying text. These categories are not necessarily exclu-
sive, as some states will blend standards or have different standards in different appeals courts. Com-
pare Connell Chevrolet Co. v. Leak, 967 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tex. App. 3d Dist. 1998) (stating that 
damages were limited to pecuniary loss and did not include emotional damages in a car transaction 
case), with Dillard’s Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Strom, 869 S.W.2d 654, 659–60 (Tex. App. 1994) (allowing 
damages for mental anguish in a fraud case between employee and employer). Additionally, states that 
disallow recovery for parasitic emotional distress damages in fraud cases will allow the fraud to serve 
as an underlying part of an independent cause of action such as IIED or NIED. Compare Neurosur-
gery & Spine Surgery, S.C. v. Goldman, 790 N.E.2d 925, 932 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“[F]raudulen t 
misrepresentation is purely an economic tort under which one may recover only monetary damages.”), 
with McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 811 (Ill. 1988) (holding that defendant’s extreme and outra-
geous behavior in pursuit  of the fraud scheme successfully established plaintiff’s IIED claim). 
 118 Pecuniary Damages, supra note 11; see Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., No. 2 CA-CV 2014-
0123, 2016 Ariz. Ct. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1581, at *17–18 (2016) (disallowing emotional distress 
recovery when plaintiff experienced “purely economic” damages rather than damage to a personal 
interest); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 444–45 (Del. 1996) (en banc) 
(barring emotional distress damages in a contract case in absence of physical injury or IIED); Ellis v. 
Crockett, 451 P.2d 814, 820 (Haw. 1969) (“There may be no recovery for mental anguish and humili-
ation not intentionally inflicted.”); Goldman, 790 N.E.2d at 932 (limiting recovery to pecuniary dam-
ages in Illinois); Bates, 467 N.W.2d at 260 (noting, under Iowa law, that even though the plaintiff may 
have experienced emotional distress, fraud is a purely economic tort and thus the plaintiff can only 
recover pecuniary damages); Sanders, Inc. v. Chesmotel Lodge, Inc., 300 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Ky. 1957) 
(finding that the proper recovery amount in fraud is pecuniary damages); Oliver v. Hilliard, No. 2010-
CA-001479, 2013 WL 762593, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2013) (holding that a fraud action cannot 
support emotional distress damages); Jourdain v. Dineen, 527 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Me. 1987) (denying 
recovery for emotional distress in a fraud case); Danca v. Taunton Sav. Bank, 429 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 
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ond) of Torts section 549, which asserts that the measure of damages for fraud-
ulent misrepresentation is the difference between the amount given by the vic-
tim and the amount received in return, plus any loss suffered due to depend-
ence on the misrepresentation. 119 Courts typically measure pecuniary damages 
based on out-of-pocket losses or benefit-of-the-bargain losses. 120 Out-of-
pocket losses may be non-reimbursed medical expenses, including any medical 
expenses that stem from emotional harm from the fraud. 121 In general, howev-
er, the plaintiff must present reimbursable treatment for mental anguish mani-
fest by the time of trial, and may not just assert a suffering cost.122 Benefit-of-
the-bargain losses compensate victims by subtracting the actual value of the 
                                                                                                          
(Mass. 1982) (allowing pecuniary damages equal to out-of-pocket losses for plaintiff); Zaniboni v. 
Seminatore, No. 02-00652-A, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 634, at *14–19 (Dec. 15, 2005) (permitting 
pecuniary damages only in separate fraud and negligent misrepresentation action s); Bro ok s v . 
Doherty, Rumble & Butler, 481 N.W.2d 120, 128–29 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the appro-
priate measure of fraud damages is either out-of-pocket losses or restoration of economic losses);  
Tolliver v. Visiting Nurse Ass’n of the Midlands, 771 N.W.2d 908, 915–16 (Neb. 2009) (“One who 
makes a fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation in a business transaction is normally liable only for 
the recipient’s pecuniary losses.”); Crowley v. Glob. Realty, 474 A.2d 1056, 1058 (N.H. 1984) (con-
cluding that emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a negligent misrepresentation claim); 
Williams v. Stewart, 112 P.3d 281, 290–91 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (allowing only pecuniary damages 
in fraud cases); Juman v. Louise Wise Servs., 663 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (App. Div. 1997) (“The damag-
es recoverable for fraud do not include emotional distress.”); Staley v. Taylor, 994 P.2d 1220, 1225–
26 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim did not fit within the state’s permitted cate-
gories for emotional distress recovery in absence of physical injury); Sparrow v. Toyota of Florence, 
Inc., 396 S.E.2d 645, 648 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (“Mental suffering, emotional shock, inconvenience, 
or embarrassment are not elements of damage in a fraud case.”); Poirier v. Blue Seal at Taft Corner, 
Inc., No. 332-3-13 Cncv, 2015 Vt. Super. LEXIS 23, at *4–5 (2015) (limiting fraud losses to pecuni-
ary damages based on the “traditional rule”); McKenney v. Pac. First Fed. Sav. Bank of Tacoma, 887 
P.2d 927, 935 (Wyo. 1994) (denying emotional distress damages in a contract fraud case). Nevada’s 
approach is somewhat less clear, because its highest court rejected a plaintiff’s argument for special 
damages and “limit[ed] any emotional distress damages to his recovery under his intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claim.” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717, 739 n.16 (Nev. 2017), 
rev’d on other grounds, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019). Conversely, Ne-
vada allowed emotional damages in another case that “sound[ed] in fraud” when the plaintiff mani-
fested physical symptoms. Betsinger v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 232 P.3d 433, 435–36 (Nev. 2010). The 
Tennessee Supreme Court let a lower court’s denial of emotional distress damages in a fraud case  
stand because the appellant did not challenge that denial on appeal. Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 
336 (Tenn. 2012). But see Whaley v. Perkins, 197 S.W.3d 665, 670 (Tenn. 2006) (assuming that emo-
tional distress damages are available in an intentional misrepresentation case associated with plain-
tiff’s home). 
 119 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549; Bates, 467 N.W.2d at 260 (referencing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549); Jourdain, 527 A.2d at 1307 (“This view, that pecuniary loss 
is the proper measure of damages in a fraud action, is consistent with that taken by the Restatement.”). 
 120 Ellis, 451 P.2d at 820. 
 121 Id. at  820; Connell Chevrolet Co., 967 S.W.2d at 891 (noting that “compensatory damages for 
pecuniary loss include[es] loss of bargained for value, consideration paid, out of pocket expenses and 
damage to one’s credit”). 
 122 See Ellis, 451 P.2d at 820 (holding that awarding pecuniary damages, such as lost wages and 
medical expenses, requires a specific loss assessment). Thus, for an accurate calculation, the medical 
expenses must be incurred by the time of trial to claim expenses. See id. 
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property at the time of the fraudulently induced sale from the tortfeasor’s rep-
resented value at that time. 123 
This purely economic characterization of fraud loss limits victim recovery 
in these courts. 124 For example, in 1991, in Bates v. Allied Mutual Insurance 
Co., the plaintiff claimed that the defendant insurance company made fraudu-
lent statements to induce a settlement after a car accident. 125 In reviewing the 
claim, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may recover only benefit-
of-the-bargain losses and consequential damages, to put the plaintiff in the eco-
nomic position they would have been in if the fraudulent statement was accu-
rate. 126 In this case, the court could not award benefit-of-the-bargain damages 
because the defendant rescinded the original settlement amount, leaving only a 
claim for out-of-pocket costs.127 The court then added that fraud is a purely eco-
nomic tort and thus damages for emotional distress are not available. 128 
Similarly, in 2000, in Staley v. Taylor, the Oregon Court of Appeals evalu-
ated what damages were available in a fraud case. 129 In Staley, the plaintiff  
made a fraud claim against the defendant neighbor in a real estate dispute.130 
The court stated that only out-of-pocket damages were available in the fraud 
action to put the plaintiff back into the position that they would have been in 
had the fraudulent activity not occurred.131 The court stated that, in the absence 
of a physical injury, emotional distress damages were only available in certain 
circumstances involving intentional acts, privacy intrusions, or nuisance ac-
                                                                                                          
 123 Id. 
 124 Bates, 467 N.W.2d at 260 (holding that fraud is an economic tort and plaintiffs can only claim 
pecuniary damages); Jourdain, 527 A.2d at 1307 (noting there was no reason to “depart from the well-
established view” that fraud only results from economic losses). 
 125 467 N.W.2d at 257. The plaintiff, George Bates, sued over injuries incurred in an automobile 
accident with an Allied customer. Id. at 256. In the original suit , both the plaintiff and the defendant 
claimed they had a green light while approaching the intersection where the accident occurred. Id. 
During the trial, however, a key defense witness recanted earlier testimony and stated that the defend-
ant entered the intersection with the red light, a fact the defendant confirmed upon confrontation by 
defense counsel. Id. at  257. 
 126 Id. at  260. Consequential damages are the indirect losses suffered by the plaintiff, such as loss 
of goodwill and other types of intangible or somewhat speculative losses. Consequential Damages, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 127 Bates, 467 N.W.2d at 260. 
 128 Id. 
 129 994 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). 
 130 Id. at  1221. The defendants in the case asked the plaintiffs for help in getting a variance ap-
proved from the city to build their house on a somewhat small neighboring lot. Id. at 1222. In ex -
change, the defendants promised the plaintiffs that they would not block the plaintiff’s ocean view. Id. 
When the defendants completed construction, however, their new home partially obscured the plain-
tiff’s ocean views. Id. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract and fraud. Id. at 1221. 
 131 Id. at  1225. 
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tions. 132 The court found none of these exceptions applicable and refused to 
allow emotional distress damages. 133 The court made no further policy discus-
sion but acknowledged that it did not address whether emotional distress had 
occurred as a result of the alleged fraud. 134 
At least one state currently denying recovery for emotional distress has 
signaled its willingness to move away from this approach.135 In 2005, in Wil-
liams v. Stewart, the New Mexico Court of Appeals contemplated the availabil-
ity of a fraud action by class action plaintiffs against a defendant laboratory.136 
The majority, citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, denied recovery of 
emotional distress damages because the state limited fraud action damages to 
pecuniary loss. 137 This opinion drew a strong dissent calling for recognition of 
emotional distress damages.138 The dissent reasoned that although such recovery 
should have limits, it was inconsistent with general tort theory to deny emotional 
distress damages in every fraud and the more appropriate position is to align 
with other jurisdictions that permit recovery.139 This rationale mirrors the one 
assumed over the last thirty years in other jurisdictions that have overturned 
precedent to recognize the availability of emotional distress damages in tort.140 
2. Recovery Through a Separate Cause of Action 
Jurisdictions that do not allow recovery for emotional distress in fraud 
cases may still allow recovery through separate IIED or NIED claims.141 Even 
                                                                                                          
 132 Id. The listing of intentional torts did not include fraud but did include trespass, racial discrim-
ination, and theft. Id. The court noted the plaintiff made the case for emotional damages under the 
nuisance category rather than the intentional tort category. Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at  1226. The court, although declining to determine whether a plaintiff could recover emo-
tional distress damages under a fraud theory, denied the damages in this case because the claimed 
emotional distress arose from a fraud claim, not a nuisance claim. Id. at  1225–26. 
 135 Williams v. Stewart, 112 P.3d 281, 291–92 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (Vigil, J., dissenting) (ques-
tioning the court’s denial of emotional distress damages for fraud victims). 
 136 Id. at  283–84 (majority opinion). The plaintiffs sued Los Alamos National Laboratory and Los 
Alamos Medical Center after the hospital provided body parts and tissue from deceased individuals to 
the laboratory without the informed consent of their families. Id. 
 137 Id. at  290 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. L. INST. 1977)). 
 138 Id. at  292 (Vigil, J., dissenting). 
 139 Id. at  292–93. The dissent cited Professor Merritt’s scholarship containing acceptable balanc-
ing approaches for recognizing emotional distress in fraud. Id. at 292 (citing Merritt, supra note 11). 
 140 See, e.g., Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 867–68 (Alaska 1999) (recognizing emo-
tional distress damages are available in fraud); Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 484 (Co nn.  
1991) (overruling prior precedent to allow recovery of emotional distress damages); Stellar v. Saucon 
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2011-C-4714, 2012 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 702, at *16–18 (C.P. Ct. Lehigh 
Cnty. 2012) (recognizing emotional distress damages in a fraud case in Pennsylvania for the f ir st  
t ime). 
 141 See Ma v. Cmty. Bank, 686 F.2d 459, 469 (7th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Wisconsin law to re-
quire the elements of IIED for plaintiff to prove the claim warranted emotional distress damages); 
Goldsborough v. 397 Props., L.L.C., No. 98C-09-001, 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 440, at *8–9 (2000) 
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without requiring an independent action, in 1982 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit, in Ma v. Community Bank, interpreted Wisconsin law to 
require plaintiffs seeking emotional damages in fraud cases to fulfill the re-
quirements for IIED. 142 The incident began with the theft of the plaintiff’s de-
posit certificates by an unknown third party.143 The plaintiff filed suit against 
the defendant bank after the bank refused to replace the stolen deposit certifi-
cates. 144 The plaintiff alleged emotional distress arising from his embarrass-
ment and humiliation during the ordeal. 145 The court held that the plaintiff’s 
suffering did not meet the IIED-like standards, and thus he could not recover 
for emotional distress. 146 
One prominent IIED case in Illinois successfully arose out of a fraud 
suit. 147 In 1988, in McGrath v. Fahey, the plaintiff brought an IIED claim 
based on the defendants’ efforts to deprive the plaintiff of financial instruments 
and property and their related harassment. 148 The Illinois Supreme Court held 
that the defendants’ behavior was extreme and outrageous, and thus the plain-
                                                                                                          
(denying an IIED claim because plaintiffs did not allege distress beyond “what is inherent in fraud”); 
McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988) (fraud underlying IIED cause of action); Tempo, 
Inc. v. Rapid Elec. Sales & Serv., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 728, 734 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that ex-
emplary damages were not available in a fraud case unless there was proof of tortious conduct sepa-
rate from the fraud). South Dakota appears to allow emotional distress damages as parasitic damages 
in fraud if the emotional distress would be severe enough to support an independent tort of IIED or 
NIED. See Stabler v. First State Bank of Roscoe, 2015 SD 44, ¶ 24, 865 N.W.2d 466, 479 (S.D. 2015) 
(disallowing plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress in a fraud case because they did not provide proof 
to support an IIED or NIED claim); see also Dziadek v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 867 F.3d 1003, 
1010 (8th Cir. 2017) (interpreting Stabler to hold that a “special showing” that supports an IIED or 
NIED claim is necessary to award emotional distress damages in fraud cases). 
 142 686 F.2d at 469. IIED recovery under Wisconsin law required that: (1) “the defendant acted 
for the purpose of causing the plaintiff emotional distress”; (2) “the defendant’s conduct was extreme 
and outrageous”; (3) that behavior was the “cause-in-fact of the injury”; and (4) “the plaintiff suffered 
an extreme disabling emotional response” as a result . Id. 
 143 Id. at  461. The theft occurred in 1971 and the plaintiff filed the action in 1973, after the bank 
failed to pay the plaintiff the amount owed on the deposit certificates. Id. at 462–63. 
 144 Id. at  463. The plaintiff alleged that bank officials told him at the time he purchased the depos-
it  certificates that in the event of loss or theft the plaintiff could call the bank and they would issue 
him new certificates. Id. at 462. After the theft, the plaintiff called the defendant bank, but the bank 
refused to issue new certificates until the plaintiff purchased a Bond of Indemnity. Id. at 461. The 
plaintiff refused this requirement because of the earlier assurances made by bank officials. Id. at 461–
62. 
 145 Id. at  463. 
 146 Id. at  469. 
 147 See McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 811 (Ill. 1988). 
 148 Id. at  807–09. The defendants pressured the plaintiff to sign additional mortgages on property 
that would financially benefit the defendants by threatening the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s medical 
practice. Id. at 812. This behavior continued even though the defendants knew that the plaintiff had a 
heart condition and continued still after the plaintiff had a heart attack. Id. 
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tiff could recover under an IIED theory after being targeted by fraud.149 The 
court discussed the power dynamic between the two parties as a contributing 
factor to the outrageousness of the conduct, noting that successful Illinois IIED 
suits frequently involve a defendant holding authoritative power over the 
plaintiff. 150 The court approved of an IIED claim that had initially arisen out of 
fraud because the underlying behavior had no legal justification, and the au-
thoritative defendants preyed on a vulnerable individual. 151 
3. Recovery for Emotional Distress through Punitive Damages 
At least six jurisdictions allow emotional distress damages as part of pu-
nitive damages to dissuade future tortfeasors from engaging in fraud.152 These 
courts look for malicious, wanton, or reckless behavior by the defendant. 153 
For example, in 1980, in Food Fair v. Anderson, the Florida Fifth District 
Court of Appeals reviewed a plaintiff employee’s claims for IIED and fraud 
against the defendant employer. 154 After denying the IIED claim on the basis 
that the defendant’s conduct did not meet the outrageousness standard, the 
court went on to consider whether the fraud case warranted damages.155 The 
court stated that although pecuniary losses and specific damages would typi-
cally be available, future lost wages were too speculative for the court to calcu-
                                                                                                          
 149 Id. at  812. The court evaluated whether the defendants’ behavior went beyond “mere insults, 
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Id. at 809 (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. L. INST. 1977)). 
 150 Id. at  810; see, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4–5 (7th Cir. 1972) (con-
cluding that defendant insurance company’s bad-faith refusal to pay a claim was outrageous); Milton 
v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 427 N.E.2d 829, 832–33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (abuse of power by work supervi-
sor). 
 151 McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 812. 
 152 See Moore Ford Co. v. Smith, 604 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Ark. 1980) (awarding punitive damages 
in an automobile odometer fraud case to deter such actions in the future); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 
382 So. 2d 150, 154–55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that although emotional distress damages 
are not generally available without physical injury, this case falls under an exception where malice of 
conduct justifies punitive damages); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 682 P.2d 1247, 1257 (Idaho 1983) (“It is 
well established in this state that punitive damages may be awarded when the defendant has commit-
ted fraud.”); W-V Enters. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 673 P.2d 1112, 1123–24 (Kan. 1983) (deny-
ing recovery for emotional distress but permitting recovery of punitive damages in same case); Olson 
v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820, 828 (N.D. 1988) (holding that “exemplary damages” are available  as 
punitive damages in cases where plaintiffs prove a fraud action); Jeffers v. Nysse, 297 N.W.2d 495, 
498–99 (Wis. 1980) (holding that wanton and reckless conduct by the defendant in a fraud case sup-
ported the award of punitive damages). 
 153 See Moore Ford, 604 S.W.2d at 948; Food Fair, 382 So. 2d at 154–55; Jeffers, 297 N.W.2d at 
498–99. 
 154 See 382 So. 2d at 151. The plaintiff employee claimed that her employer required her to take a 
polygraph test and forced her to confess to thefts from the defendant’s store. Id. at 151–52. The plain-
tiff confessed after the defendant promised that she would be able to keep her job if she admitted to 
the thefts. Id. Nevertheless, the defendant fired the plaintiff based on her confession. Id. at 152. 
 155 Id. at  153. 
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late specific damages, as it was unclear how long the defendant would contin-
ue to employ the plaintiff. 156 The court then considered whether the plaintiff 
employee’s injury included the experience of emotional distress, and whether 
punitive damages were available in the absence of specific damages.157 Alt-
hough the court found that the defendant’s actions did not rise to the level of 
outrage necessary to satisfy the requirements of IIED, the defendant’s mali-
cious fraud supported awarding punitive damages. 158 
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court confronted the choice of emotional 
distress damages or punitive damages in the 1983 decision W-V Enterprises v. 
Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. 159 The plaintiff business sued the 
defendant savings and loan over statements the defendant made that induced 
the plaintiff into investing in an (ultimately failed) project. 160 The trial court 
awarded emotional distress damages totaling $200,000 and punitive damages 
totaling $250,000. 161 On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court denied emotional 
distress damages because the plaintiff could not link their alleged distress to 
any specific acts by the defendant. 162 Despite this, the court held that punitive 
damages remained available because the plaintiff established the independent 
tort of fraud. 163 Thus, the court upheld the full $250,000 punitive damages  
award based on the defendant’s fraudulent conduct. 164 
4. Recovery for Emotional Distress in Fraud Cases 
The remaining courts recognize emotional distress via parasitic damages 
(available from the host fraud cause of action), although states differ on what 
                                                                                                          
 156 Id. at  153–54. The court explained that the plaintiffs did not submit any evidence showing the 
likelihood that the defendant would retain the employee for a certain period and thus could not recover 
those wage damages. Id. 
 157 Id. at  154. 
 158 Id. at  154–55. Typically, the court did not recognize pain and suffering damages in the ab-
sence of a physical injury. Id. An exception was available in the presence of malice, however, and the 
court pointed to the defendant’s elicitation of a confession and subsequent firing of the emplo yee 
based on that confession as malicious. Id. 
 159 See 673 P.2d 1112, 1123–24 (Kan. 1983). 
 160 Id. at  1115. The underlying project was the design and construction of apartments. Id. The 
defendant made certain promises regarding financing of the project that never materialized, leading to 
the plaintiff’s financial insolvency. Id. at 1117–18. The defendants argued that it made contingent 
rather than firm offers and hence no liability existed. Id. at 1118–19. 
 161 Id. at  1123–24. 
 162 Id. at  1123. The court further held that “[t]o find otherwise would permit recovery for every 
individual who suffered emotional problems after a substantial financial loss.” Id. at 1123–24. 
 163 Id. at  1124. The court stated that in a breach of contract case an independent tort was neces-
sary for the award of punitive damages. Id. Thus, because the plaintiff proved fraud, punitive damages 
were appropriate. Id. 
 164 Id. 
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types of behavior or injuries qualify for recovery in fraud cases.165 In some juris-
dictions, the standard for awarding parasitic damages in fraud cases for emotion-
al distress mirrors the state’s requirements for IIED and/or NIED claims.166 State 
criteria fall into the following categories: damages for “severe” emotional dis-
tress;167 damages when the defendant acted with intentional malfeasance or bad 
faith;168 damages when the defendant could foresee the plaintiff’s emotional dis-
tress;169 damages for emotional distress available by statute;170 and emotional 
distress damages if the plaintiff can show a “physical manifestation.”171 
First, some jurisdictions, including Alabama, Alaska, Montana, and Utah, 
recognize emotional distress damages in fraud cases when emotional distress is 
“severe.”172 In 1985, in Roberts v. United States Home Corp., the Texas Fourth 
                                                                                                          
 165 See, e.g., Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 868 (Alaska 1999) (permitting recovery 
for emotional distress for severe damages); Jahn v. Brickey, 214 Cal. Rptr. 119, 124 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(holding that emotional damages are available, even if the defendant’s conduct was merely negligent, 
if their conduct contains “elements of intentional malfeasance or bad faith”); Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 
593 A.2d 478, 484–85 (Conn. 1991) (allowing recovery of emotional distress damages in fraud cases, 
even when the defendant caused the distress unintentionally, if the resulting distress was foreseeable); 
Pampattiwar v. Hinson, 756 S.E.2d 246, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (allowing emotional distress damag-
es if the plaintiff’s entire injury was to their “peace, happiness, or feelings”); Ditcharo v. Stepanek, 
538 So. 2d 309, 314 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (noting the statutory availability of emotional distress dam-
ages in tort actions); Hoffman v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 296–98 (Md. 2005) (holding that emotional 
distress damages are available in fraud cases with “physical” injury, and that Maryland law includes 
depression, loss of appetite, and upset stomachs in the category of physical injuries). West Virginia 
awards emotional distress damages in fraud cases, although the standard for such an award is unclear. 
See Miller v. Miller, 613 S.E.2d 87, 91 (W. Va. 2005) (deciding division of marital property in a di-
vorce case and stating “that damages recoverable in fraud actions may include pain and suffering,  
punitive damages, and annoyance and inconvenience”). 
 166 See, e.g., Nelson, 976 P.2d at 868 (requiring severe damage to plaintiff’s mental state before 
awarding compensation for emotional distress, in line with the state’s IIED requirements); Kilduff, 
593 A.2d at 484–85 (citing standards from an unintentional infliction of emotional distress case and 
applying those to emotional damages in a fraud cases); Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 734 (Md.  
1979) (applying a NIED standard requiring a physical manifestation of emotional injury to a fraud 
case). 
 167 See infra notes 172–180 and accompanying text. 
 168 See infra notes 181–187 and accompanying text. 
 169 See infra notes 188–192 and accompanying text. 
 170 See infra notes 193–196 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 197–204 and accompanying text. 
 172 See Cochran v. Ward, 935 So. 2d 1169, 1176–77 (Ala. 2006) (upholding emotional distress 
damages based on evidence of condition severity of condition); Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 
859, 868 (Alaska 1999) (disallowing emotional distress damages because, although the plaintiff was 
upset and aggravated by the defendant insurance company, the level of distress was not severe); Gurn-
sey v. Conklin Co., 751 P.2d 151, 157 (Mont. 1988) (requiring the plaintiff to show “significant im-
pact” when claiming emotional injury in fraud); Roberts v. U.S. Home Corp., 694 S.W.2d 129, 136 
(Tex. App. 1985) (stating the requirement for emotional damages implies a relatively high degree of 
mental pain and distress); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, ¶¶ 102–06, 65 
P.3d 1134, 1164–65 (allowing emotional distress damages in fraud cases where plaintiff experienced 
severe distress as a proximate result of the fraud), rev’d on other grounds, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
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Court of Appeals confronted what level of mental anguish a plaintiff must 
demonstrate to qualify for severe emotional distress damages.173 The Roberts 
plaintiff alleged fraudulent representation by the defendant owners of his 
home’s subdivision regarding a signed promissory note. 174 The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendants’ actions made him feel embarrassed and ashamed.175 The 
court, however, denied emotional distress damages. 176 The court reasoned that 
recoverable emotional distress required evidence of mental pain and suffering 
from indignation, grief, public humiliation, or shame. 177 The Alaska Supreme 
Court adopted a similar standard in 1999 in Nelson v. Progressive Corp., a case 
arising from a dispute between a plaintiff insured and a defendant insurance 
company. 178 The court held that feelings of aggravation or anger were insuffi-
cient to support emotional distress damages. 179 Although the court observed 
that the facts reflected some emotional distress, the plaintiff did not experience 
severe distress and, therefore, could not recover.180 
Second, an alternative standard allows emotional damages when the de-
fendant acted with intentional malfeasance or bad faith, separate from punitive 
damage calculations. 181 The Mississippi Court of Appeals addressed the ele-
                                                                                                          
 173 694 S.W.2d at 136. 
 174 Id. at  131. The plaintiff signed a promissory note as part of closing on his home in the subdivi-
sion. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s salesperson assured him that he would not have to 
pay on that note. Id. Nevertheless, the defendant later filed suit  against the plaintiff to recover on the 
note. Id. 
 175 Id. at  136. The plaintiff attributed these feelings to the defendants’ violation of an ear lier 
promise that he need not repay the promissory note, which defendants then sued to recover. Id. at 133. 
 176 Id. at  136. The court stated emotional distress damages cannot come from “mere disappoint-
ment, anger, restraint or embarrassment.” Id. 
 177 Id. In the case cited in Roberts, the Texas Civil Appeals Court upheld emotional distress dam-
ages where the plaintiffs experienced loss of sleep, humiliation, and stomach aches. Trevino v. Sw. 
Bell Tel. Co., 582 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
 178 See 976 P.2d 859, 862 (Alaska 1999). The plaintiff carried an auto insurance policy with unin-
sured motorist coverage from the insurer defendant. Id. After an auto accident with an uninsured 
drunk driver, the plaintiff filed an insurance claim for his physical injuries and property damages. Id. 
The defendant offered to settle for amounts ranging from $10,000 to $18,000, amounts the plaintiff 
rejected. Id. The plaintiff prevailed in arbitration and then filed suit  based on the defendant’s alleged 
bad faith actions in refusing to settle. Id. at  863. 
 179 Id. at  868. 
 180 Id. The court does not define severity in the opinion, however, it does state that the plaintiff’s 
anger, anguish, and stated emotional distress in letters to the defendant did not meet the standard. Id. 
The Nelson court cites Roberts as support for recognizing severe emotional distress. Id. (citing Rob-
erts, 694 S.W.2d at 136). In Roberts, severity required that “a plaintiff must show more than mere 
worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.” 694 S.W.2d at 136. 
 181 See Emmons v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 480, 485 (S.D.  
Ohio 1982) (applying Ohio law and holding that nonpecuniary damages for mental anguish  were 
available for wanton or malicious fraudulent acts); Jahn v. Brickey, 214 Cal. Rptr. 119, 124 (Ct. App. 
1985) (allowing emotional distress damages, even if the defendant’s conduct was negligent, if that 
conduct contained elements of intentional wrongdoing or bad faith); Mullen v. Cogdell, 643 N.E.2d 
390, 401–02 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (permitting emotional damages in intentional frauds); T.G. Black-
well Chevrolet Co. v. Eshee, 261 So. 2d 481, 485 (Miss. 1972) (noting that emotional distress damag-
2021] Emotional Distress Damages in Fraud 727 
ment of intent or bad faith in fraud in 2005 in Sumler v. East Ford, Inc.182 The 
plaintiff claimed emotional distress arising from an alleged fraudulent repos-
session by the defendant car dealership. 183 The court noted that the standard in 
Mississippi for emotional distress recovery is intentional, wanton, or reckless 
conduct by the defendant. 184 The plaintiff must prove such intentional or mali-
cious conduct.185 The court held that the plaintiff’s testimony did not meet that 
burden and upheld a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. 186 California 
embraces a similar standard, requiring elements of intent or bad faith before 
awarding emotional distress damages in fraud cases, even if the larger  c ase 
centers on negligent conduct. 187 
Third, Connecticut and Virginia allow emotional distress damages if the 
defendant could reasonably foresee that their fraud would cause the plaintiff’s 
emotional distress. 188 In 1991, in Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., the Connecticut Su-
                                                                                                          
es are available in fraud cases when the defendant committed the fraud intentionally, wantonly, or 
recklessly); Sumler v. E. Ford, Inc., 2004-CA-01574-COA (¶ 26), 915 So. 2d 1081, 1088–89 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2005) (requiring plaintiff to show evidence of intentional or willful wrong); Fetick v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., 38 S.W.3d 415, 419 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (disallowing mental suffering damages 
without a physical injury unless the defendant acted intentionally or maliciously and such distress 
must be medically diagnosable); Morris v. MacNab, 135 A.2d 657, 662 (N.J. 1957) (recognizing emo-
tional distress damages that are the proximate cause of intentional fraudulent conduct); Coble v. Bow-
ers, 809 P.2d 69, 73 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990) (discussing willful, actionable torts in fraud as a basis for 
emotional distress damages). North Carolina required wanton or malicious conduct to uphold emo-
tional distress damages under a “conversion” theory. Morrow v. Kings Dep’t Stores, Inc., 290 S.E.2d 
732, 735–36 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982). 
 182 2004-CA-01574-COA (¶ 26), 915 So. 2d at 1084. 
 183 Id. The plaintiffs purchased a vehicle from the defendant car dealership and arranged financ-
ing through the defendant. Id. ¶ 10, 1084. The defendant’s salesperson falsified the plaintiffs’ infor-
mation to make it  appear that the plaintiff had more income to improve their creditworthiness. Id.  
¶¶ 2–3, 1084–85. Eventually, the defendant discovered the employee’s fraud and terminated him,  
however, after a series of assignments, plaintiffs stopped making payments on the vehicle because it 
was unclear to them who the payee was. Id. ¶¶ 3–9, 1085–86. Eventually, the defendant dealership 
repossessed the vehicle. Id. ¶ 10, 1086. The plaintiffs filed suit over this repossession and argued that 
the defendant employee’s fraud and subsequent assignments of the note interfered with their ability to 
pay. Id. The repossession process caused the plaintiff to feel “stressed out and upset.” Id. ¶ 30, 1089. 
 184 Id. ¶ 26, 1089. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at  ¶ 31, 1090. The court noted that the plaintiffs’ claims, including embarrassment and 
humiliation, were mostly overlapping notions and did not provide separate support for the emotional 
distress claim. Id. 
 187 See Jahn v. Brickey, 214 Cal. Rptr. 119, 124 (Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing emotional distress 
damages under a real estate statute for fraud that was negligent as a matter of law but also included 
evidence of intent or bad faith). 
 188 See Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 485 (Conn. 1991) (holding that the defendant’s 
fraud must be a proximate cause of the mental anguish and that the defendant could reasonably fore-
see that anguish); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. O’Neal, 297 S.E.2d 647, 653 (Va. 1982) (permitting emo-
tional distress damages because the defendant acted intentionally and this malicious act caused fore-
seeable emotional harm). Colorado also appears to follow this standard in fraud cases, relying on the 
knowledge of the defendant in the case to predict emotional harm to the plaintiff. McNeill v. Allen, 
534 P.2d 813, 818–19 (Colo. App. 1975). 
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preme Court permitted emotional distress damages in a suit alleging fraudulent 
misrepresentation that led to the loss of the plaintiff’s home. 189 The defendant, 
relying on Connecticut precedent, claimed that such damages were not availa-
ble in this fraud case. 190 The court looked to other jurisdictions to determine 
that emotional distress damages are available if the fraud proximately caused 
the emotional distress, and the defendant could reasonably foresee that dis -
tress. 191 Applying this rule to the case facts, the court upheld the trial court’s 
award of emotional damages resulting from the defendant’s fraudulent misrep-
resentation. 192 
Fourth, Georgia and Louisiana allow recovery of emotional distress dam-
ages by statute. 193 In 2014, in Pampattiwar v. Hinson, the Georgia Court of  
Appeals reviewed a fraud claim by a plaintiff attorney against their former cli-
ent. 194 The plaintiff did not claim any pecuniary losses and claimed damages 
only for “wounded feelings,” as allowed under the Georgia statute. 195 The ap-
pellate court upheld the damage award because the entire injury was  to the 
plaintiff’s “peace, happiness, or feelings,” which the statute was designed to 
compensate. 196 
Finally, several states, including Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washing-
ton, require a physical manifestation of an emotional injury to recover emo-
tional distress damages in fraud. 197 The Maryland Court of Appeals evaluated a 
                                                                                                          
 189 593 A.2d at 480. 
 190 Id. at  484. 
 191 Id. The court went on to say this was consistent with rulings in similar contexts, including 
cases in the employment, unintentional infliction of emotional distress, and insurance contexts. Id. 
The court also concluded that this standard applies even in cases in which the tortfeasor unintentional-
ly caused the emotional distress. Id. at 485. 
 192 Id. 
 193 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-6 (2020) (for civil wrong cases “in which the entire injury is to 
the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff” the only damages available are those assigned by a 
jury); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2020) ( stating that “[e]very act whatever of man that causes 
damage to another” requires a defendant to compensate the plaintiff); Pampattiwar v. Hinson, 756 
S.E.2d 246, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (allowing recovery for emotional distress when the entire suf-
fered injury was the plaintiff’s “peace, happiness, or feelings” under Georgia statute § 5 1 -12 -6 ); 
Ditcharo v. Stepanek, 538 So. 2d 309, 314 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (finding mental anguish damages were 
available under tort claims under the Louisiana Civil Code article 2315). 
 194 756 S.E.2d at 249–50. The plaintiff attorney sued their former client defendant because the 
defendant had made misrepresentations to the attorney about prior proceedings in his divorce case and 
had been extremely confrontational about paying his legal bills. Id. at 249. After the plaintiff terminat-
ed her representation of the defendant, the former client wrote extremely negative online reviews 
about the attorney and accused her of being a crook and inflating legal bills. Id. The plaintiff sued 
based on the defendant’s representations and online posting. Id. at  250. 
 195 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-6; Pampattiwar, 756 S.E.2d at 250. 
 196 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-6; Pampattiwar, 756 S.E.2d at 252. 
 197 See Hoffman v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 298 (Md. 2005) (recognizing emotional distress dam-
ages where the distress results in a “physical” injury such as depression, withdrawal from social inter-
action, and chest pains); Stellar v. Saucon Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2011-C-4714, 2012 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. 
Dec. LEXIS 702, at *20–21 (C.P. Ct. Lehigh Cty. 2012) (requiring both foreseeability of emotional 
2021] Emotional Distress Damages in Fraud 729 
claim for emotional distress by plaintiff real estate purchasers against defend-
ant sellers in Hoffman v. Stamper in 2005. 198 The court stated that plaintiffs  
could recover emotional distress damages in a fraud case when there is an as-
sociated physical injury. 199 Hoffman did not present a physical injury in the 
traditional sense; instead, the court explained that Maryland law recognized 
any injuries that the court could objectively identify. 200 Recoverable injuries  
included an inability to work, headaches, depression, nausea, and insomnia.201 
Applying the objective injury rule, the court overturned findings of emotional 
distress damages for all but one of the plaintiffs. 202 The plaintiff deemed de-
serving of such damages testified that he would experience headac hes  and 
vomiting when he thought about the underlying fraud matter.203 These symp-
toms were “objectively ascertainable” evidence of emotional distress that the 
court felt comfortable relying on to permit emotional damages in the absence 
of the classic immediate physical impact prerequisite. 204 
B. Emotional Damages in American Tort Law and the Impact of Trauma 
Examining tort law broadly, American courts have long recognized emo-
tional distress damages but initially allowed parasitic damages only when as-
sociated with physical injury. 205 Over time, judges invoked breakthroughs in 
                                                                                                          
injury and physical manifestation of emotional injury); McRae v. Bolstad, 646 P.2d 771, 775 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1982) (“Mental suffering, to be compensable, must be manifested by objective symptoms 
though actual physical impact need not be shown.”); see also Betsinger v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 232 P.3d 
433, 435–36 (Nev. 2010) (holding in a deceptive trade practices case “that sound[ed] in fraud” that 
emotional distress damages required physical manifestation). Rhode Island’s standard is unclear, alt-
hough in at least one case the Superior Court upheld emotional distress damages in fraud that mani-
fested as suicidality and eventual loss of victim’s life. See Sanzi v. Shetty, No. PC 2000-4523, 2002 
R.I. Super. LEXIS 79, at *37–39 (2002) (permitting fraud claim where emotional distress accompa-
nied physical harm in addition to economic damages). 
 198 867 A.2d at 279. The plaintiffs claimed the defendants purchased the property and then found 
buyers with poor education and credit to buy the homes at prices way over their actual value. Id. at  
281. The defendants promised to fix up the homes and helped arrange financing for the plaintiffs to 
pay the homes’ high price. Id. The defendants failed to make these repairs and many of the plaintiffs 
either lost their homes in foreclosure or could not occupy their homes because of their poor condi-
tions. Id. All of the plaintiffs claimed emotional distress, but only one plaintiff made claims of associ-
ated physical symptoms. Id. at 295. 
 199 Id. at 298. 
 200 Id. at  296. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at  298. 
 203 Id. at  295. 
 204 See id. at  295, 298. 
 205 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 456 (AM. L. INST. 1977); Vance v. Vance, 408 
A.2d 728, 731 (Md. 1979) (noting that damages for emotional distress had a “parasitic status” and 
plaintiffs could recover only when there was an immediate physical injury); Spade v. Lynn & Bos. 
Ry. Co., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897) (disallowing recovery for fright or alarm in the absence of a  
physical injury), abrogated by Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Canning v. 
Williamstown, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 451, 452 (1848) (allowing recovery of emotional damages due to 
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psychiatric diagnosis and screening to eschew the physical impact rule for  
modern standards. These courts applied a broader concept of injury to include 
emotional distress claims and began to recognize other tort theories—namely 
IIED and NIED—to compensate for emotional harm independently.206 The new 
prevailing rule permits emotional distress damages if any physical injury mani-
fested as a result of the tort, but this reform has still been met with criticism.207 
Proponents of the physical manifestation rule warn that removing this re-
quirement will result in a tidal wave of potentially baseless emotional distress 
claims. 208 For example, in 1993, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
in Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co. confronted the issue of emotional distress dam-
ages arising from a gas explosion that destroyed the plaintiffs’ home. 209 The 
defendants sought dismissal of the emotional distress claim because the plain-
tiffs did not sufficiently plead physical symptoms of their emotional distress.210 
The unanimous court disagreed, stating that although the state does require 
evidence of physical symptoms, the plaintiffs provided enough evidenc e to 
take the question of emotional distress to the jury. 211 
                                                                                                          
associated physical injury); Renner v. Canfield, 30 N.W. 435, 436 (Minn. 1886) (stating that awarding 
emotional damages requires a physical injury). The standard, though, began to stretch to embrace 
more attenuated definitions of “physical impact.” See, e.g., Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869, 869 (Ohio 
1930) (allowing recovery of emotional damages because smoke inhalation satisfied immediate physi-
cal contact). Courts began to reject the physical impact rule completely when there were physical 
manifestations of the emotional trauma. Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164–65 (Colo. 1978); 
Dziokonski, 380 N.E.2d at 1299 (abandoning the physical impact rule when the emotional distress was 
foreseeable at the time of the tort). 
 206 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 47, 48 
(AM. L. INST. 2012) (recognizing a separately cognizable claim when the defendant’s negligent ac-
tions result in serious emotional harm); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 46 (listing requirements 
for recovery based on extreme and outrageous conduct); Towns, 579 P.2d at 1164 (discussing t he 
abandonment of the physical impact rule paralleling the advancement of psychiatric diagnosis). 
 207 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 456 (stating that a defendant’s negligent action that 
results in a physical injury arising from emotional disturbance creates liability for that defendant);  
Vance, 408 A.2d at 732 (discussing the “modern rule” permitting recovery when there is a physical 
injury arising from negligence). The term “physical injury” is not limited to external injuries, and may 
include depression, headaches, loss of appetite, and insomnia. See Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 249 
P.2d 843, 844 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (mental disturbances as physical injury); Hoffman, 867 A.2d 
at 297 (physical manifestations of emotional harm include depression, loss of appetite, nightmares, 
and insomnia); Toms v. McConnell, 207 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (depression and 
withdrawal from socialization). The Restatement (Third) of Torts has abandoned a physical manifesta-
tion requirement and now states that emotional harm is compensable independent of the physical 
injury. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 47, 48. 
 208 See Hoffman, 867 A.2d at 298 (requiring physical manifestation because it  is “objectively 
ascertainable”); Johnson v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592 (N.Y. 1975) (noting that emotional harm is 
“easily counterfeited”). 
 209 605 N.E.2d 805, 805–06 (Mass. 1993). The plaintiffs sued the defendant natural gas company 
for their negligence in the explosion along with their emotional distress claim. Id. 
 210 Id. at  806. 
 211 Id. at  810–11. One plaintiff provided evidence of distress manifesting as diarrhea for a year 
after the explosion, which the trial judge and Supreme Judicial Court agreed was physical evidence of 
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Conversely, other jurisdictions believe that judges and juries are compe-
tent to review distress claims even in the absence of a physical manifesta-
tion. 212 The California Supreme Court abandoned the physical manifestation 
requirement in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals in 1980. 213 The plaintiff 
in Molien sued the defendant hospital system after an incorrect diagnosis given 
to his wife led to the break-up of their marriage. 214 Previously, recovery under 
California law required physical injury either at the time of the incident or re-
sulting from the emotional distress. 215 State case law also included decisions 
recognizing emotional distress damages in separate claims as long as the plain-
tiff demonstrated “substantial invasions of clearly protected interests.”216 The 
court held that no physical injury was necessary for emotional damages; in-
stead, the standard should rely on the evidence supporting the emotional dis-
tress and leave it to the jury to assess the severity of that distress.217 
This modern debate among state courts intertwines with the development 
of the understanding of emotional distress caused by traumatic experiences.218 
During the twentieth century, psychiatry developed from a somewhat unstruc-
tured art into a more rigorous diagnostic system, bolstering recognition for  
                                                                                                          
emotional distress. Id. at 806, 810. The Supreme Judicial Court also held the second plaintiff, whose 
claim the trial court judge dismissed, demonstrated physical manifestations to provided evidence of 
emotional distress. Id. at 810. The second plaintiff submitted medical records attesting to ten sion 
headaches in addition to depositions claiming “that he had suffered from sleeplessness, gastrointesti-
nal distress, upset stomach, nightmares, depression, feelings of despair, difficulty in driving and work-
ing, and an overall ‘lousy’ feeling allegedly resulting from the explosion.” Id. at 806. 
 212 See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (relying on the trier 
of fact’s experience, rather than a physical injury or manifestation test, to determine the presence of an 
emotional injury); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519–20 (Haw. 1970) (holding that courts can 
evaluate independent claims for emotional distress without attendant physical injury and that such a 
system will not result in an avalanche of fake suits), superseded by statute, 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws 12–
13, as recognized in City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1997); Camper v. Minor ,  91 5 
S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996) (dropping the physical manifestation requirement but instead requiring 
that the emotional injury be “‘serious’ or ‘severe’” and that the plaintiff must provide medical or sci-
entific proof of the injury). 
 213 See 616 P.2d at 821. 
 214 Id. at  814–15. The defendant hospital’s physician misdiagnosed the plaintiff’s wife with syphi-
lis. Id. at  814. Due to this misdiagnosis, concerns of infidelity arose in the marriage leading to their 
divorce. Id. at 814–15. The plaintiff sued for NIED and loss of consortium. Id. at  814. 
 215 Id. at  819. The court noted prior decisions wanted evidence of physical injury or manifestation 
to assure “ the validity of the claim.” Id. 
 216 Id. (quoting Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967)). Earlier in the opinion the 
California court quoted the New York Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that “[f]reedom from mental 
disturbance is now a protected interest in this State.” Id. at 818 (quoting Ferrara v. Galluchio, 15 2 
N.E.2d 249, 252 (N.Y. 1958)). 
 217 Id. at  821. The court noted that the main issue is proof of distress rather than an “artificial and 
often arbitrary classification scheme.” Id. 
 218 See Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Mo. 1983) (crediting the development of psy-
chiatric testing as assisting courts in measuring the existence and extent of emotional harm). 
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emotional distress in the legal realm and insurance industry. 219 Further, ad-
vanced psychiatric diagnostics discovered physical changes in the brains  of  
individuals who experienced severe trauma. 220 These lasting consequences im-
pact behavior and quality of life for trauma victims. 221 
In the unique fraud context, however, researchers have yet to study the 
full spectrum of non-economic victim consequences, so the details of  suc h 
emotional distress come from other sources.222 Media and trial accounts attest 
to fraud victims suffering from many of the same symptoms as other trauma 
victims, such as depression, loss of appetite, nightmares, insomnia, and other 
negative personal ramifications. 223 Victims experiencing these feelings, in ad-
dition to feeling shame at being defrauded in the first place, may seek to hide 
their victimization from others.224 The Department of Justice estimates that 
only fifteen percent of victims report fraud, leaving many to deal with the issue 
alone. 225 
Claims of emotional distress associated with fraud cases tend to arise in 
deeply personal transactions, such as real estate, personal automobile, insur-
ance, and employment deals. 226 Affinity fraud, where the fraudster  targets 
members of a specific group, also tends to engender emotional distress for vic-
tims. 227 The Baptist Foundation of Arizona fraud of the late 1990s was one of 
                                                                                                          
 219 VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at 139 (noting that insurance companies require an emotional 
distress diagnosis prior to patient reimbursement); see, e.g., Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769 (“[T]he devel-
opment of psychiatric tests and refinement of diagnostic techniques have enabled science to establish 
with reasonable medical certainty the existence and severity of psychic harm.”). The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders was the first major attempt to categorize and create diagnostic 
criteria for mental issues recognized by the American Psychiatric Association. VAN DER KOLK, supra 
note 19, at 139; DSM History, supra note 19. 
 220 VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at 82–85. 
 221 Id. 
 222 See Search PubMed, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed [https://perma.cc/2LT7-UJSC] (various combinations of Fraud or Fraudulent or Financial or 
“White Collar” and Victim or Trauma or Traumatic or Emotion or Distress yielded few relevant re-
sults). 
 223 See, e.g., Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 868 (Alaska 1999) (anger and stress 
disrupting life); Hoffman v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 296 (Md. 2005) (depression, headaches, insom-
nia); Cartwright, supra note 1 (insomnia and distress). 
 224 Financial Fraud Crime Victims, supra note 30. 
 225 Id. The rationales for underreporting fraud also include belief that nothing will be done about 
it  or that officials will not take the report seriously. Id. 
 226 See, e.g., Nelson, 976 P.2d at 862 (insurance recovery); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 3 82  
So. 2d 150, 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (employer/employee fraud case); Sumler v. E. Ford, Inc., 
2004-CA-01574-COA (¶ 10), 915 So. 2d 1081, 1086 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (automobile reposses-
sion); Roberts v. U.S. Home Corp., 694 S.W.2d 129, 129 (Tex. App. 1985) (real estate fraud); Car t-
wright, supra note 1 (retirement funds); Bob Sullivan, The FBI’s Secret Weapon Against Lottery and 
Romance Scammers, CNBC (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/06/the-fbis-secret-weapon-
against-lottery-and-romance-scammers.html [https://perma.cc/E99T-BUD9] (romance scams). 
 227 See Ganzini et al., supra note 21, at 56 (describing how the targeting of a specific affinity 
group by a Ponzi scheme engenders emotional distress because the fraudster tends to be a member of 
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the largest affinity fraud cases, in both total economic loss and number of vic-
tims, in American history. 228 The foundation was a legitimate retirement sav-
ings vehicle, but when losses began to mount from failed investments, its lead-
ership concealed the losses and defrauded investors. 229 Many of these defraud-
ed investors invested in the foundation upon invitation from their spiritual and 
social anchor—their church.230 The fraud’s revelation caused panic, insomnia, 
and lifelong financial stress for victims who lost their retirement savings.231 
Limited psychiatric research has captured the magnitude and prevalence 
of these devastating mental health consequences.232 In a 1990 evaluation of  
senior citizens exploited by a similar Ponzi scheme, 29% of the victims had a 
major depressive episode within twenty months of the fraud, and 45% devel-
oped or exacerbated a generalized anxiety disorder. 233 Depressive episodes  
persisted in these victims, supporting a conclusion that the initial financial 
losses led to turmoil elsewhere in victims’ lives, such as the loss of a home or 
an inability to pay debts, perpetuating further mental health ramifications.234 
A preliminary 2017 study found that fraud victims who received no or lit-
tle post-fraud financial compensation were more likely to self-report poor 
physical health than those who received greater financial remuneration.235 In a 
2019 follow-up, those same researchers learned from survey respondents that 
victims of moderate to severe financial fraud had higher rates of mental health 
issues and poorer overall health than non-victims. 236 These results evince the 
significant non-economic repercussions of fraud and support calls for the law 
to unanimously recognize emotional distress damages. 237 
                                                                                                          
the affinity group and thus betrays a greater trust than an outsider would ordinarily hold); Affin ity 
Fraud, supra note 7 (defining affinity fraud as “investment scams that prey upon members of identifi-
able groups, such as religious or ethnic communities, the elderly, or professional groups”). These 
victims put their trust in a group or individual who then deceives them out of their money. See Ganzi-
ni et al., supra note 21, at 56. 
 228 Cartwright, supra note 1; Graff, supra note 5. 
 229 Cartwright, supra note 1. 
 230 Id. One investor thought it was the safest investment “[b]ecause we thought we were dealing 
with Christians and a real Christian doesn’t steal your money.” Id. 
 231 Cartwright, supra note 1; Graff, supra note 5. 
 232 See Ganzini et al., supra note 21, at 56. A Ponzi scheme, also called a pyramid scheme, seeks 
to enroll new sets of investors who must then recruit  additional new investors to meet financial com-
mitments to earlier investors, but generally these later investing individuals receive no return on their 
funds. Ponzi Scheme, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 233 Ganzini et al., supra note 21, at 59. 
 234 Id. at  59–60. 
 235 Zunzunegui et al., supra note 21, at 317–18. 
 236 Sarriá et al., supra note 6, at 10. The researchers emphasized that their review of related litera-
ture in addition to their novel survey findings evidenced that fraud-induced stress connects to “depres-
sion, anxiety, and other mental illness.” Id. at  11. 
 237 See infra note 238 and accompanying text. 
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III. MAKING VICTIMS WHOLE: COURTS SHOULD EVALUATE EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS IN FRAUD CASES BASED ON A SEVERITY STANDARD 
Pecuniary damages do not make all plaintiffs whole, and thus all jurisdic-
tions should allow emotional distress damages in fraud cases.238 Psychiatric 
diagnostic advancements have shifted courts from a strict physical impact rule 
to today’s various standards.239 Significant developments in trauma treatment 
should spur American courts beyond formalistic physical manifestation and 
independent diagnosis requirements to more flexible standards for jury evalua-
tion. 240 Section A of this Part addresses the jurisdictions that still deny emo-
tional distress damages based on a formalistic adherence to outdated treatis-
es. 241 Section B argues that jurisdictions updating their approach to allow jury 
evaluation of emotional distress damages should adopt a flexible severity 
standard. 242 Finally, Section C discusses why alternative standards fail to rec-
ognize emotional distress damages in fraud appropriately. 243 
A. All Jurisdictions Should Recognize Emotional  
Distress Damages in Fraud 
Emotional distress in fraud cases is prevalent in psychiatric research, me-
dia accounts, and case law, and thus barring recovery is incongruous with tort 
law principles of victim restitution. 244 Despite a reluctance to recognize them 
in fraud cases, jurisdictions that bar fraud emotional distress damages do allow 
them in other tort contexts.245 For example, the New York Court of Appeals  
recognized emotional distress damages independent of other injuries in a med-
ical malpractice case in Ferrara v. Galluchio in 1958.246 Yet, when a plaintiff 
                                                                                                          
 238 See Merritt, supra note 11, at 3 (calling for recognition of emotional distress damages in fraud 
cases). 
 239 Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Colo. 1978) (dropping the physical impact r e-
quirement based on advances in psychiatry and psychology); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 
769 (Mo. 1983) (same). These new state standards for emotional distress damages focus on physical 
manifestation of symptoms, foreseeability, expert corroboration, and severity. See supra notes 71–105 
and accompanying text. 
 240 See infra notes 259–280 and accompanying text. 
 241 See infra notes 244–258 and accompanying text. 
 242 See infra notes 259–266 and accompanying text. 
 243 See infra notes 267–280 and accompanying text. 
 244 See, e.g., Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 485 (Conn. 1991) (emotional distress at loss 
of home); Hoffman v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 295 (Md. 2005) (depression, loss of appetite, and upset 
stomachs in fraud case); Ganzini et al., supra note 21, at 59 (demonstrating emotional distress in affin-
ity fraud victims); Cartwright, supra note 1 (sleeplessness and distress at loss of retirement savings). 
 245 Compare Juman v. Louise Wise Servs., 663 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (App. Div. 1997) (denying 
recovery of emotional distress damages in a fraud case), with Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 
252 (N.Y. 1958) (holding that “[f]reedom from mental disturbance is now a protected interest in this 
State” in a malpractice action). 
 246 152 N.E.2d at 252. 
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brought a fraud case against a hospital, claiming emotional distress on similar 
facts, the state denied those damages because the plaintiff could only recover 
pecuniary losses. 247 Likewise, Iowa courts recognize emotional distress dam-
ages in NIED cases when there is supporting medical testimony and a subse-
quent physical manifestation of that distress. 248 As such, the state recognizes 
emotional distress upon sufficient medical diagnostic evidence.249 In fraud cas-
es, however, Iowa courts still adhere to a formalistic reliance on treatises and 
precedent to prevent recovery for emotional distress.250 
Jurisdictions that still deny emotional distress damages draw support from 
treatises, notably the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 251 Reliance on the Re-
statement, however, is questionable as its text and illustrations provide excep-
tions that allow emotional distress damages in fraud. 252 There is, at the very 
least, a live debate about the propriety of denying emotional distress damages 
in fraud cases based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 253 
                                                                                                          
 247 Rivera v. Wyckoff Heights Hosp., 584 N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (App. Div. 1992); see also Juman, 
663 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (“The damages recoverable for fraud do not include emotional distress.”). 
 248 Roling v. Daily, 596 N.W.2d 72, 75–76 (Iowa 1999). 
 249 See id. at  76 (relying on medical testimony to establish the existence and magnitude of emo-
tional distress). 
 250 See Bates v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 467 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Iowa 1991) (denying emotional dis-
tress in a fraud case based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 
369, 382 (Iowa 1987)); see also Cornell, 408 N.W.2d at 382 (disallowing emotional distress damages 
in fraud cases based on the Dobbs on Remedies treatise). 
 251 See, e.g., Ellis v. Crockett, 451 P.2d 814, 820 (Haw. 1969) (relying on Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 549 to deny emotional distress damages in a fraud case); Stich v. Oakdale Dental Ctr., P.C., 
501 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (App. Div. 1986) (denying recovery of emotional distress in a fraud case  
based on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549); Bates, 467 N.W.2d at 260 (relying on Restatement 
(Second) of Torts); Cornell, 408 N.W.2d at 382 (relying on the Dobbs on Remedies treatise). 
 252 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“An actor who makes a 
misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical harm which results from an act done by 
the other or a third person in reliance upon the truth of the representation . . . .”); id. § 557A (“One 
who by a fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a fact that it  is his duty to disclose causes 
physical harm to the person . . . is subject to liability . . . .”); Stellar v. Saucon Mut. Ins. Co . ,  No.  
2011-C-4714, 2012 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 702, at *18 (C.P. Ct. Lehigh Cty. 2012) (noting 
that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310 and § 557A allow recovery of emotional distress in fraud 
when it  causes physical harm).  
 253 See, e.g., Tolliver v. Visiting Nurse Ass’n of the Midlands, 771 N.W.2d 908, 917 (Neb. 2009) 
(denying emotional distress claims for plaintiff estate when defendant’s fraud led to physical an d 
emotional suffering during decedent’s hospice care). In contrast to Stellar, the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska read Restatement (Second) of Torts § 557A as excluding nonpecuniary losses. Compare Tol-
liver, 771 N.W.2d at 915 (holding that § 557A contains “scant support” for emotional distress damag-
es), with Stellar, 2012 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 702, at *18 (citing to Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 557A to support the proposition that “where the misrepresentation itself results in physical 
harm . . . recovery for all resulting for all resulting injuries is appropriate”). As such, there is disa-
greement about the reading of § 557A, but the Stellar court’s holding recognizes that just because a 
“cause of action sounded in deceit” does not mean courts should bar “the natural and proximate harm” 
of the claim, including emotional distress. 2012 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 702, at *18. 
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Applying IIED or NIED theories to emotional distress, instead of allow-
ing straightforward parasitic damages, sets the bar too high for meaningful re-
covery. 254 In IIED claims, the behavior must be extreme and outrageous to 
qualify for recovery. 255 IIED should be invoked as a separate tort to capture 
claims that would otherwise fall outside available causes of action, not as  a 
means to access damages in a fraud cause of action. 256 Similarly, NIED claims 
cannot appropriately substitute for parasitic damages because that tort’s pur-
pose is to provide an independent remedy. 257 Fraud alone presents a potentially 
complete inquiry, and thus courts, for reasons of judicial efficiency,  should 
widen the scope of fraud actions to include emotional distress damages instead 
of requiring a plaintiff to prove the separate elements of NIED. 258 
B. Severity Should Determine Emotional Distress Damages 
In contrast to other methods, the severity standard is sufficiently flexible 
to evaluate emotional distress damages in fraud cases.259 This standard is in-
clusive of the varied ways in which people experience trauma by allowing 
plaintiffs to demonstrate the severity of their harm through medical or scien-
tific expert reports, physical manifestations of emotional distress, or evidence 
of the fraud’s malicious nature. 260 In doing so, this standard preserves the best 
                                                                                                          
 254 See, e.g., McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988) (discussing Illinois’ high stand-
ards before a claim can be extreme and outrageous). This high bar is set with purpose as judges want 
to avoid turning trivial incidents or “mere bad manners” from becoming causes of action. Merritt ,  
supra note 11, at 20. Conversely, parasitic damages are available when the plaintiff demonstrates the 
burden for the “host” cause of action. Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, 896 P.2d 411, 418 (Mont. 
1995). 
 255 See McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 809–12 (considering power dynamics, defendant’s knowledge of 
the victim’s susceptibility, and the legitimacy of defendant’s purpose to determine what qualifies as 
extreme and outrageous conduct). 
 256 See Merritt, supra note 11, at 20–21. 
 257 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 
(AM. L. INST. 2012) (discussing the elements of NIED); Bowman v. Williams, 165 A. 182, 184–85 
(Md. 1933) (allowing NIED damages when plaintiff is a close relative of victim and in close proximi-
ty to injurious act); Merritt, supra note 11, at 23 (“As with intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
the standards developed to restrict the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress should not be 
applied to fraud actions.”). 
 258 See Merritt, supra note 11, at 23 (arguing the policy rationales underlying NIED and IIED, 
such as preventing claims for “petty antisocial conduct,” do not apply to fraud victims for mental 
anguish). 
 259 See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Home Corp., 694 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex. App. 1985) (going beyond 
mere embarrassment but recognizing indignation, shame and public humiliation). 
 260 See Cochran v. Ward, 935 So. 2d 1169, 1176–77 (Ala. 2006) (recognizing an anxiety condi-
tion resulting from fraud that required medication); Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 868 
(Alaska 1999) (requiring more evidence to support a threshold showing of severity before allowing a 
jury to determine emotional distress damages); Gurnsey v. Conklin Co., 751 P.2d 151, 157 (Mont. 
1988) (requiring a finding of severe emotional distress that aggravated a previous physical injury); 
Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996) (including a medical expert opinion requirement 
to support a severity standard in a NIED case). 
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aspects of its alternatives (namely the foreseeability, intent or malice, medical 
opinion, and physical manifestation tests) without imposing formalistic re-
quirements or focusing too heavily on the defendant’s subjective mindset.261 
Furthermore, the severity standard recognizes that the scientific literature on 
trauma continues to develop and avoids a rigid standard that may one day be-
come as anachronistic as the physical impact rule. 262 
One concern with this standard is that judges will set the threshold so 
high to avoid summary judgment on these damages as to prevent most juries 
from hearing this evidence. 263 Nevertheless, this plaintiff-focused standard’s 
flexibility is preferable to alternatives that focus on the defendant’s ability to 
foresee the distress or require overly formalistic documentation. 264 Judges  
should trust jurors to evaluate the evidence for themselves to determine wheth-
er the defrauded plaintiff’s experience amounts to a severe emotional injury.265 
Under this standard, plaintiffs get a fair shot at just compensation, and defend-
ants remain protected against frivolous claims. 266 
                                                                                                          
 261 See, e.g., Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446 (approving a “general negligence approach” in NIED 
cases and allowing damages where a severe injury is such that a reasonable person could not handle 
the emotional distress caused by the situation). This standard still provides protection for defendants 
against “ trivial” or fake claims. Id. 
 262 See Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Colo. 1978) (holding that psychiatric advance-
ments support overturning the physical impact requirement); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 
769 (Mo. 1983) (same); see also VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at 329–30 (discussing developments 
in the neuroscience area of neurofeedback and the questions of the mind remaining to be answered); 
Search PubMed, supra note 222 (various combinations of Fraud or Fraudulent or Financial or “White 
Collar” and Victim or Trauma or Traumatic OR Emotion or Distress produced few results, indicating 
lack of current medical research on the topic). 
 263 See Dziadek v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 867 F.3d 1003, 1010 (8th Cir. 2017) (interpreting 
Stabler v. First State Bank of Roscoe, 2015 SD 44, ¶ 24, 865 N.W.2d 466, 479 (S.D. 2015) to require 
plaintiffs to demonstrate elements of IIED or NIED before awarding emotional distress damages in 
fraud); Nelson, 976 P.2d at 868 (preventing the jury from hearing evidence of emotional distress be-
cause the case facts did not meet an IIED severity standard, even though the court recognized t he  
plaintiff likely suffered emotionally); see also Ganzini et al., supra note 21, at 59 (detailing varying 
manifestations of trauma experienced by affinity fraud victims). 
 264 See infra notes 267–279 and accompanying text. 
 265 See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (“[T]he jurors are best 
situated to determine whether and to what extent the defendant’s conduct caused emotional distress, 
by referring to their own experience.”); Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446 (adopting a reasonable person 
standard as the threshold inquiry for emotional distress damages in an NIED case). Based on the prev-
alence of fraud in America, jury members likely have an idea of reasonable reactions to fraud based 
on personal or familial experience. See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, supra note 6, a t 4  
(explaining that pervasive losses by businesses provide a number of individuals with experience deal-
ing with fraud in their workplace); Aitken, supra note 6 (jurors may also deal with fraud through their 
credit card); Daly, supra note 6 (hundreds of thousands of people put their lives back together after 
identity theft). 
 266 See Merritt, supra note 11, at 24 (concluding that fraud goes beyond economic harm and that 
emotional distress damages are necessary to make the plaintiff whole). A severity standard likewise 
removes the risk that plaintiffs will raise emotional distress damages in all fraud cases with the hope 
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C. Foreseeability, Intent, or Physical Manifestation Should Not  
Determine Emotional Distress Damages 
Jurisdictions recognizing emotional distress damages in fraud should em-
ploy one administrable, just standard: the severity approach. 267 This standard 
provides the best avenue for plaintiff recovery, although still preserving de-
fendant safeguards against frivolous claims. 268 This Section will demonstrate 
the nonviability of alternative methods. 269 
First, the physical manifestation rule suffers from the same pitfalls as the 
physical impact rule. 270 Jurisdictions rejected the physical impact rule because 
courts stretched the meaning of “physical” to fit absurd circumstances, yet, 
those same jurisdictions now stretch the definition of physical manifestation to 
fit cases into the new rule. 271 Further, this rule requires plaintiffs to manifest 
physical symptoms within a short period after the fraud, even though the trau-
ma may not manifest outward symptoms for some time after an incident. 272 
Maintaining such a rule to prevent frivolous claims only promotes the same 
fiction of the physical impact rule that most courts now reject.273 
Second, the foreseeability requirement and the intentional and malicious 
conduct requirement both fail to recognize that emotional distress is always a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of fraud, regardless of the defendant’s 
intent or malice. 274 By negligently or intentionally making a misrepresentation 
                                                                                                          
of getting increased damages regardless of their actual emotional experience. See id. at 27–28 (severi-
ty standard reduces claims to only severe injuries). 
 267 See, e.g., Nelson, 976 P.2d at 868 (evaluating emotional distress in fraud through a severity 
standard); Gurnsey v. Conklin Co., 751 P.2d 151, 157 (Mont. 1988) (requiring “significant impact 
upon the person of the plaintiff”); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, ¶¶ 102–
06, 65 P.3d 1134, 1164–65 (requiring severe injury foreseeable by defendant), rev’d on other grounds, 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 268 See Nelson, 976 P.2d at 868 (mere aggravation and frustration do not meet the severity stand-
ard). 
 269 See infra notes 270–279 and accompanying text. 
 270 See Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Mo. 1983) (rejecting replacing the physical 
impact rule with the physical manifestation rule because “the requirement of physical injury resulting 
from the emotional distress merely meant the replacement of one arbitrary, artificial rule with another 
which was only somewhat less restrictive”). 
 271 See Hoffman v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 295–96 (Md. 2005) (in a physical manifestation juris-
diction, noting that the physical impact rule stretched the definition of physical to avoid arbitr ary  
results but then discussing the “elastic” definition of “physical” under the physical manifestation rule). 
 272 See VAN DER KOLK, supra note 19, at 7–11 (discussing how the mind may initially repress 
traumatic memories but triggers may cause issues to manifest months or years later). 
 273 See Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772 (observing that, over time, many courts rejected the physical 
injury requirement for emotional distress damages). 
 274 See Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 485 (Conn. 1991) (awarding emotional distress 
damages in a fraud case because the defendant could foresee the distress); Fetick v. Am. Cyanamid 
Co., 38 S.W.3d 415, 419 (Mo. 2001) (requiring the defendant to act with intent or malice  before 
awarding emotional distress damages in fraud cases). A defendant with the ability to defraud t he 
plaintiff likely held a place of financial trust or power over the plaintiff, and their tortious misstate-
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sufficient to sustain a fraud claim under the Restatement, the defendant must 
compensate for all damages that flow from that tort. 275 The plaintiff’s emotion-
al distress, particularly in the realm of personal frauds that tends to generate 
such damages, is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions.276 As 
such, a foreseeability-centric standard leaves defendants open to potentially 
unsubstantiated emotional distress claims and thus disrupts the balance of in-
terests between the parties. 277 
Finally, a medical or scientific expert opinion requirement attaches an un-
necessarily formalistic requirement to recovery.278 Although a medical report 
may strengthen a plaintiff’s case for emotional distress, requiring one adds to 
plaintiff costs and may unnecessarily waste the court’s time. 279 As such, it is in 
the best interest of plaintiffs, defendants, and courts to follow a flexible severi-
ty standard to evaluate emotional distress claims in fraud. 280 
                                                                                                          
ments can foreseeably distress plaintiffs. See Emmons v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
532 F. Supp. 480, 481 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (defendant stockbroker); Jahn v. Brickey, 214 Cal. Rptr. 119, 
120 (Ct. App. 1985) (defendant real estate agent); T.G. Blackwell Chevrolet Co. v. Eshee, 261 So. 2d 
481, 482 (Miss. 1972) (defendant auto dealer); Fetick, 38 S.W.3d at 417 (defendant drug manufacturer 
and plaintiff prescribing physician). Plaintiffs, regardless of the intent of the defendant, may still expe-
rience emotional distress as a result  of the fraud. See Kilduff, 593 A.2d at 485 (recovery in fraud for 
unintentional emotional distress); Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 733–34 (Md. 1979) (sustaining 
emotional distress damages in negligent misrepresentation case where plaintiff demonstrated shock, 
spontaneous crying, and emotional detachment). 
 275 See Kilduff, 593 A.2d at 484 (allowing “emotional [distress] damages that are the natural and 
proximate result” of the tort). 
 276 See supra note 274 and accompanying text; see also Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 443 
(Tenn. 1996) (the foreseeability standard lacks “concrete guidelines” for courts and juries). Academic 
research advocating for the foreseeability standard in fraud cases acknowledges that the “plaintiff’s 
distress is easily foreseen.” Merritt, supra note 11, at 26. 
 277 See Merritt, supra note 11, at 27–28 (arguing for a foreseeability standard, but recognizing a 
requirement for serious distress might be necessary to “winnow out false claims and discourage plain-
tiffs from seeking recovery for trivial injuries”). This important distinction aligns with the Tennessee 
Supreme Court’s approach to NIED claims and supports application of the severity standard, focusing 
on the plaintiff’s injury, rather than the foreseeability standard focusing on the defendant. See Camp-
er, 915 S.W.2d at 446. 
 278 See Thornton v. Garcini, 928 N.E.2d 804, 809 (Ill. 2010) (holding that, although expert testi-
mony may aid the jury, it is not necessary to sustain an NIED claim); Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446 
(overhauling Tennessee NIED requirements to a “general negligence” standard but still requir ing 
expert scientific or medical evidence to corroborate the claim). 
 279 See Thornton, 928 N.E.2d at 809–10 (reasoning that plaintiff’s case did not require support of 
medical testimony because the jury could find emotional distress based on personal experience alone). 
In fact, the case cited in Camper to support requiring medical or scientific evidence merely states that 
courts should allow plaintiffs to submit such evidence to prove emotional distress; it  does not state 
that it is a requirement. See Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 767 (Haw. 1974); Camper, 915 S.W.2d 
at 446. 
 280 See supra notes 259–266 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Fraud creates emotional distress in its victims that the law should com-
pensate as a real injury. The ever-developing psychiatric understanding of 
trauma now reflects fraud’s true impact, both immediate and latent, on victims’ 
physical and mental well-being. Fraud victims still need further study, but 
court filings and media accounts already reflect clear parallels to the distress 
experienced by victims of physical trauma. The jurisdictions that still deny 
emotional distress recovery in fraud cases rely on formalistic adherenc e to 
treatises and precedents that do not conform to a modern understanding of  
trauma. Recognizing emotional distress damages in fraud cases is not a signifi-
cant change. Most jurisdictions already recognize emotional distress damages 
in other tort contexts and could merely extend them to fraud cases. Upon ex-
tension of emotional distress damages, proper award assessment should rely on 
evidence of the severity of the distress. Physical manifestations, independent 
medical and scientific data, and evidence of malice by the defendant can all 
reliably inform jurors as to the level of severity. An alternative dependence on 
the physical manifestation of the emotional injury harkens back to the aban-
doned physical impact rule and invokes administrative convenience to the det-
riment of aggrieved plaintiffs. In the end, courts should trust jurors to evaluate 
the severity of emotional distress based on this evidence and their own experi-
ences. In doing so, jurors in all jurisdictions could finally make fraud victims 
genuinely whole. 
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